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ABSTRACT
In shared decision-making, doctors provide patients with information about
difficult trade-off treatment decisions so the patient can make an informed choice. Many
models of decision-making assume that patients make decisions based on long-term,
stable preferences, but research suggests that people dynamically construct preferences
for each decision. Affect plays at least two roles in preference construction. First,
coherence shifting, or altering preferences prior to choice to make one alternative more
attractive, may regulate emotion. Difficult decisions, imagining unpleasant outcomes, and
threats to closely held goals produce general negative affect, and coherence shifting may
reduce this. Second, preferences for alternatives may be constructed from immediate
affective reactions, driving choice.
Two dichotomous trade-off health decision scenarios were produced that are
highly conflicted on outcome unpleasantness. Experiment 1 compared a serious disease
trade-off decision with a job selection task used in prior research on preference
construction. Experiment 2 compared decision-making between serious and mild disease
treatment decisions differing in outcome severity, also including a physiological affect
measure. In both experiments, choice was best predicted by a model including only affect
towards alternatives within a decision context. Prediction was not improved by including
outcome and attribute ratings independent of decision context, providing support for
preference construction over revealed preferences. Coherence shifting of outcome affect
and attribute importance ratings was fully or partially supported in all four tasks. Tasks
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with more severe outcomes or threatening higher-level goals (e.g., survival) produced
more aversive feelings but did not lead to stronger coherence shifting.
Keywords: affect heuristic, preference construction, decision-making, health
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INTRODUCTION
Shared decision making is an increasingly prominent paradigm in health care,
including academic and medical research (Makoul & Clayman, 2006) and practical
integration in large-scale government health programs (Elwyn et al., 2010). Elwyn et al.
define shared decision making as “an approach where clinicians and patients share the
best available evidence when faced with the task of making decisions, and where patients
are supported to consider options, to achieve informed preferences” (p. 971).
Communication tools known as decision aids have been developed for a variety of health
contexts to aid clinicians and patients in shared decision-making scenarios (Stacey et al.,
2011). Health decisions that patients may face in shared decision making, such as
choosing to modify a treatment for cancer, often involve weighing costs and benefits on a
variety of dimensions such as out-of-pocket cost, toxicity (side effects), and efficacy
(e.g., Wong et al., 2013; Stacey et al., 2011). These types of multi-attribute decisions are
commonly studied in psychology, and there are many well-documented strategies and
processes for choosing between alternatives. These often involve subjective appraisals of
the attributes on which alternatives can be compared and the specific outcomes of the
alternatives. Elwyn et al. (2012), for example, suggest that clinicians should ask patients
what (attribute) is most important to them in order to guide them to a preference.
There is no guarantee, however, that a patient’s subjective appraisals will be
relevant towards their long-term goals or that they will base their decision on the
maximum amount of evidence presented to them. This may be the case even when
decision aids use design elements that reduce the need for numerical or health literacy,
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such as evaluative categories (Peters et al., 2009). To provide information in a manner
that is useful and beneficial to patients, we must understand how participants arrive at
preferences and how they use these preferences to reach a decision. Within the large field
of decision-making, this dissertation will focus on the issue of revealed versus
constructed preferences. Namely, do decisions reveal underlying preferences, or are
preferences constructed in the context of that decision?
Several authors have noted the important role of emotions in decision-making. In
a review of health decision-making literature, Carpenter and Niedenthal (2017) provided
a number of ways in which decision-making generates aversive feelings and how such
feelings can guide or divert the decision-making process, and further proposed that the
processes of generating preferences and controlling emotion are interlinked. In particular,
they emphasize findings by Carpenter, Yates, Preston and Chen (2016) suggesting that
difficult decisions produce aversive feelings and that the process of altering preferences
across the course of decision-making to support a single alternative (e.g., Simon,
Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 2004) serves to regulate these emotions. Alternatively, Slovic,
Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2004) and Bechara and Damasio (2005) suggest that
emotions themselves are often the method by which a decision is reached, and several
later studies suggest that choice is best predicted by emotion (Charpentier, De Neve, Li,
Roiser, & Sharot, 2016; Schlösser, Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2013). It is also likely that
health decisions will produce stronger negative emotions because they involve imagining
visceral physical consequences that threaten higher-level goals like survival
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Luce, 1998).
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The goal of this research project is to examine the role of emotions in a complex,
multi-attribute health decision trade-off. In particular, this project was focused on the
following questions. Will people show higher aversive feelings and more negative affect
towards decision aspects (e.g., outcomes and alternatives) when facing a more serious
health-based decision? Does affect towards aspects of a decision predict choice of a
medical treatment better than other models of decision making, including more
cognitively costly ones? Will people faced with a health decision engage in the shifting of
preferences to support their final decision, and will this shifting reduce aversive feelings
arising from a difficult decision? Finally, does the decision context impact this shifting?
In this dissertation, I explored these concepts using three difficult trade-off
decision tasks in two experiments, manipulating the emotional salience and context of the
tasks. In the first experiment, affect was measured across the course of decision making
in a previously developed job-selection task and a newly developed shared-treatment
decision scenario for a serious disease. The second experiment compared two novel
shared-treatment decision scenarios of varying disease severity (serious and mild) with
the addition of an objective physiological measure of affect.
The Construction of Preferences
The goal of presenting patients with as much evidence-based information as
possible is to allow them to make an informed, rational decision about their health
(Elwyn et al., 2012). One of the most comprehensive and cognitively difficult methods of
decision-making, which is designed to use all possible evidence, is the weighted additive
strategy. Under this process, patients would rate the utility of all possible outcomes, rate
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the importance of the attributes under comparison, and linearly multiply importance by
utility before summing scores for each alternative. The alternative with the highest score
would be selected. Simplified, qualitative versions of this method exist that account for
the lack of ability of non-experts to give meaningful utility or importance ratings (Hastie
& Dawes, 2010). Weighted additive effectively uses all information in difficult,
conflicted decisions (where there is not one alternative that is superior on all outcomes)
because positive outcomes on one or more attributes can compensate for negative
outcomes on other attributes.
Other, less cognitively intensive processes focus only on a single attribute. In
lexicographic decision making, patients select the alternative with the best outcome on
the most important attribute, such as picking the treatment with the highest survivability
(Hastie & Dawes, 2010). Patients the using elimination by aspects strategy will reject any
alternative with unacceptable outcomes on the most important alternative (e.g., rejecting
all treatments with side effects that are too severe; Tversky, 1972). These two methods
align with instructions for patients in shared decision making to think about what is most
important to them, although a well-informed patient would have enough information to
use a strategy like weighted additive (Elwyn et al., 2012).
The ability of weighted additive and the other processes specifically mentioned
above to consistently produce the maximum possible utility (or personal value) across
many decisions, however, relies on the basis that people’s preferences about outcomes
and attributes are invariant across both decision context and time. A preference in one
decision must represent some stable, underlying or revealed preference (von Neumann &
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Morgenstern, 1947). Research in the field of preference construction has brought this
assumption into doubt. In one paradigm, Simon and colleagues (Simon, Pham, Le, &
Holyoak, 2001; Simon et al., 2004) conducted a series of studies investigating dynamic
preference construction, i.e., how people change underlying preferences until one
alternative can meet their needs. Under this model, rather than accessing stable and
invariant preferences and using them for a decision process in a conflicted decision,
people alter (i.e., construct) their preferences prior to making a choice in order to make
one alternative the most attractive. For an extreme judgement-based example, members
of a jury given ambiguous evidence may alter the perceived strength of evidence for or
against a crime based on a simple first impression of the defendant, continuing until the
evidence for that initial leaning appears overwhelming and the evidence against it seems
negligible (Simon, 2004). Simon et al. (2004) explain this process using connectionist
constraint-satisfaction networks, suggesting that attributes and outcomes that are similar
(i.e., are attractive for the same alternative) will receive increasing activation while
outcomes supporting other alternatives are inhibited. This leads to altered preferences that
are uniformly high for one alternative and uniformly low towards the others, thus
strongly supporting a single alternative. Simon et al. refer to this process of changing
preferences aligning over time in order to support a single alternative as coherence
shifting.
Simon et al. (2004) examined coherence shifting in difficult multi-attribute
decisions using a job offer scenario, measuring preferences for alternatives and outcomes
(which are the inputs to the weighted additive model) at three separate times in one
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decision. Participants were first shown attributes (e.g., salary, commute) and specific
outcomes (e.g., salary $600 below industry average, 18 minute commute) related to job
offers but outside of the context of any specific job (pre-choice). Participants rated
outcomes in terms of desirability and attributes in terms of importance. After a distractor
task, participants were presented with two hypothetical job offers using four attributes
and eight outcomes they had previously rated. This job decision was conflicted and
represented a difficult trade-off, with each job superior on two attributes and inferior on
the other two. Differences balanced to provide a similar overall utility, but a fifth attribute
was manipulated to give one job or the other a small advantage. Participants were told to
delay their decision due to a possible job offer retraction, but rated outcomes and
alternatives a second time (mid-choice). Participants were then allowed to continue with
their decision and provided final (post-choice) ratings. The authors found that participants
significantly shifted their importance weights and outcome ratings between the prechoice and mid-choice measures such that they were more positive towards the winning
traits of the offer they selected and more negative towards traits favoring the offer they
had rejected. This suggests that preferences related to attributes and outcomes can change
during the course of making a single decision and that the direction of these choices
depends on the final choice, which Simon et al. refer to as coherence shifting. (These
shifts are not permanent. Simon & Spiller (2016) found preferences returned to perchoice levels within 6 weeks. Simon, Krawczyk, Bleicher, and Holyoak, (2008) found
that preferences returned within one week, and perhaps as quickly as 15 minutes.)
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Emotions from Decision-Making
Carpenter et al. (2016) believed making difficult, conflicted, multi-attribute
decisions produces negative emotions, and that coherence shifting might serve as a
process to regulate that emotion. The authors performed three conceptual replications of
Simon et al. (2004). First, they found that increasing the level of conflict in a difficult
multi-attribute decision (e.g., higher distance between outcomes on attributes, such as a
larger difference in salaries) caused increasing aversive, negative feelings in participants.
Second, they replicated the job offer task and three measurement times, but also included
self-report measures of decision difficulty and a measure of physiological arousal (skin
conductance response). Stronger shifting in preferences was associated with higher selfreported ease of decision-making, and those who strongly shifted preferences were the
only ones to show a reduction in physiological arousal between the mid- and post-choice
measures. In the third experiment, a manipulation that reduced available cognitive
resources resulted in less coherence shifting. This aligns with findings that emotional
regulation is a cognitively intensive process that leads to depletion of cognitive control
resources (Hobson, Saunders, Al-Khindi, & Inzlicht, 2014).
Carpenter et al. (2016) took these findings as evidence that negative emotions
arise from decisions in proportion to their difficulty (level of conflict between outcomes),
and that coherence shifting serves to regulate these negative emotions. Coherence shifting
reduces the perceived difficulty of the decision by making one option more attractive.
This results in less internal conflict and decision difficulty than deciding based on stable,
highly conflicted preferences from the pre-decision time. General negative emotions are
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important in a health context because they can lead to biases or deficiencies in decision
making. Kuykendall and Keating (1990) found that inducing a negative mood unrelated
to a critical reasoning task (i.e., reading an unrelated unpleasant article) led to more
systematic thinking, but in other studies negative affect was associated with reduced
performance in perceptual decision tasks, a tendency to delay decisions, or (most
importantly) a preference for less risky or threatening alternatives (Byrne, Peters, &
Willis, 2018; Lerner & Kentner, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Luce, 1998).
Importantly, Carpenter et al. (2016) did not address the context or specific content
of the decision as a source of affect, merely the level of conflict. Taken alone, their
theory would suggest similar levels of aversive emotions in an emotionally neutral
shopping task or a serious health decision, as long as the level of conflict between
alternatives (difficulty) is similar. Carpenter and Niedenthal (2017) later addressed this
conflict as the primary source of decision-related emotion in their review on health
decision-making, although they did suggest that emotional regulation from coherence
shifting can also reduce long-term negative emotions that are common in patients facing
health decisions.
However, high conflict between outcomes is far from the only source of negative
emotion in the health decision process. Luce (1998) defined decision “difficulty” as the
extent to which the decision threatens higher-level goals, rather than differences in
outcomes. In a consumer decision-making study, Luce presented participants with one of
two numerically identical car buying tasks, changing the names of two attributes. These
attributes had been pre-rated as being equally important to buying a car (e.g., Routine
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handling vs. Occupant (crash) survival), but attributes in one condition threatened higherlevel goals like safety or esteem. Luce found that decisions produced more general
negative affect when attributes threatened higher-level goals, even if the attributes in
question were rated of equal importance to the task. I am continuing Carpenter et al.’s
research into coherence shifting and regulation of aversive feelings, but I expanded this
research in Experiment 1 by using two decision scenarios that vary in the levels of goals
threatened for participants (e.g., comfort in the job task vs. survival in the disease task).
In addition to threatening important goals, descriptions of health decisions often
involve physical symptoms or side effects that are viscerally imaginable and produce an
immediate physiological response, both of which can have direct impact on negative
emotion (Carpenter and Niedenthal, 2017; Loewenstein et al, 2001). This is related to
Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis, which states that emotions in decision-making
arise from bioregulatory neural processes that either come from or mimic physiological
states in the body (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). The somatic marker hypothesis, however,
goes beyond theories of how difficult decisions produce general negative emotions,
suggesting that negative and positive affect are also mechanisms driving choice. In
Experiment 2, I expanded on research by Carpenter et al. (2016) by using two tasks that
both threaten higher-level goals but vary in the unpleasantness of their outcomes (i.e.,
moderately unpleasant in mild disease treatments versus highly unpleasant in serious
disease treatments.).
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Emotions as Decision-Making
To explain the direct role of emotion in decision-making, Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, and MacGregor (2004) proposed a process known as the affect heuristic. This had
its basis in early research on public risk perception, which showed that people evaluate
public health risks based primarily on emotional dread of consequences and
unfamiliarity, rather than quantitative or expert information (Slovic, 1987). Slovic and
colleagues proposed that features of an object, location, or situation are automatically
compared to affect-based markers in memory, leading to an immediate emotional
reaction. These somatic markers are aspects of past experiences that are associated with
physiological emotion-states and are used to judge current situations or alternatives
(Bechara and Damasio, 2005). In decision-making, this immediate emotional reaction can
alter perceptions and evaluations of outcomes or alternatives or even be the only driver of
the decision-making process (e.g., avoiding alternatives evoking negative feelings and
seeking those evoking positive feelings). The affect heuristic has the benefit of being an
experience-based and low-effort process, but the disadvantage of discounting quantitative
and non-emotional evidence. Also, it does not function well if relevant experience is not
available (Slovic et al., 2004). Even if a more complex decision-making strategy is used,
short-term affect that arises from imagining future outcomes is often what participants
weigh when making decisions (Lowenstein et al., 2001). Peters (2006) suggests that even
in cognitively intensive decision making, people may be unable to place value or utility
on outcomes or meaningfully compare outcomes on different attributes if those outcomes
are not affectively evaluable, with affective reactions operating in place of utility ratings.
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These affective reactions may not be stable over time or decisions, being constructed
from the combination of somatic markers that happen to be activated by the specific
presentation of the alternative as a whole rather than being a simple additive combination
of affect towards those outcomes (Bechara & Damasio; Slovic et al.). These affective
responses are fast, temporary, and situation-specific and can be influenced by factors
such as the particular alternatives presented, the order of information perceived, and
decision-irrelevant affect or arousal (Kuykendall & Keating, 1990; Loewenstein et al.;
Slovic et al.) . Thus, the affect heuristic may be another type of preference construction.
(See the discussion of stochastic models below.)
Some evidence of the direct predictive value of affect on decision-making has
been found in the related field of probabilistic or risky decision-making. Charpentier et
al. (2016) asked participants to rate their expected happiness or unhappiness upon
hypothetically winning or losing various amounts of money, before exposing them to
approximately 300 trials of a simulated decision between a sure option and a risky 50-50
gamble using the monetary amounts rated. Participant’s choice of sure bets or gambles
was best predicted by a model containing only emotions towards the monetary values in
the outcomes. Adding additional terms to the model for probability of outcomes and
framing effects (i.e. different weighting of losses versus gains, Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) did not improve this prediction. Note that Simon et al. (2004) asked participants to
rate outcomes in the job offer task on a single-item scale of desirability, which is similar
to this predicted happiness rating or a simple positive-negative (valence) affect scale
(Lowenstein et al., 2001; Peters, 2006).
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Schlösser et al. (2013) conducted a series of similar studies involving real
monetary rewards to evaluate the predictive ability of both overall affect towards
alternatives (similar to the affect heuristic) and affect towards specific outcomes. Their
studies replicated well-known gambling tasks and were arranged such that the expected
utility of each alternative was identical, similar to a conflicted trade-off multi-attribute
decision. Participants were asked to rate their feelings toward each future outcome of a
choice (won, lost, would’ve won, or would’ve lost) as well as overall alternative-related
emotion (sure bet and gamble) using a more complex multi-dimensional measure of
emotion (i.e., pleasure, arousal, and dominance) before selecting an alternative. They
found that outcome-related and alternative-related affect each individually improved
prediction of choice to a significant extent, but the model with only alternative-based
emotions was the most predictive. Alternative-based emotions mediated the relationship
between outcome-based emotions and choice, but also had independent effects beyond
mediation.
This finding is conceptually similar to stochastic models of multi-attribute choice
such the diffusion decision model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) and the leaky competing
accumulator model (Usher & McClelland, 2001). According to these models, as people
randomly sample attributes when comparing two alternatives, positive affect towards the
best outcome on each attribute will increase activation towards one alternative and inhibit
activation towards the other alternative. A decision is made when one alternative reaches
some threshold of sufficient activation, whether or not all outcomes have been
considered. The diffusion decision model is capable of making specific predictions about
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decision time that have been supported in repeated trials with simple choices (Ratcliff &
McKoon).
However, the diffusion decision and leaky competing accumulator models only
describe one direction of activation flow, where outcomes provide activation and lateral
inhibition towards alternatives. Examining activation in the other direction (alternatives
to outcomes/attributes) as well as lateral connections between alternatives and outcomes
could explain positive and negative changes in preferences during coherence shifting. If
we also treat outcomes and attributes as nodes with changing activation, then any
activation towards an alternative may also increase activation towards outcomes and
attributes that support that alternative (leading to higher importance and utility ratings)
and laterally inhibit outcomes and attributes that do not (leading to lower importance and
utility ratings). Simon et al. (2004) used a constraint satisfaction network to model
preference shifting. In these networks, there are bidirectional connections between
outcomes and alternatives as well as lateral connections between outcomes and attributes
(Hunt, 2002). There is some evidence for this direction of activation in an analogous
public risk perception context. Alhakami and Slovic (1994) found that positive or
negative affect towards a wide variety of technologies (e.g., nuclear power) affected
participants’ subjective ratings of the risks and benefits (outcomes) of adopting those
technologies.
In two experiments, I examined both directions of influence by adapting past
methods used to study coherence shifting (preference for an alternative towards
outcomes and attributes; Simon, 2004) and those used to predict choice (outcomes,
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attributes, and affect towards chosen alternative; Charpentier et al., 2016; Schlösser et
al., 2013). Using both types of analyses allowed me to fill an important gap in both
research programs. In addition, using a predictive analysis allowed me to test multiple
decision strategies in order to identify what decision information best predicts choice in
simulated shared treatment decisions.
Summary of Decision Making
In summary, there are multiple models of decision making that could be used to
explain how patients handle difficult trade-offs in a shared decision context. Weighted
additive is thought to generally lead to decisions that maximize utility (von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1947) and deals with difficult trade-offs by expending considerable
cognitive effort to consider preferences towards all available information. Attribute-based
models (lexicographic, elimination by aspects) simplify the decision by discarding all
information not related to one or a few critical attributes. These specific models reflect
what experts instruct patients to do in shared decision-making. Weighted additive and
attribute-based models rely on the idea that as an alternative becomes more preferred
during the decision process, the increased preference for the alternative does not feed
back to influence preferences for outcomes or attributes. This means that patients’
preferences are stable over time and they will make decisions that optimally match their
stable preferences in the long term. It is important to note that shared decision making
advocates are not overly concerned with the assumption of stable preferences (Elwyn et
al., 2012).
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In contrast, emotion or affect-based models of decision making assume that
preferences for outcomes, attributes, and alternatives are constructed in the context of a
single decision and can change during the decision process. The affect heuristic suggests
that choice is influenced by a rapid affective judgement of each alternative as a whole
based on the particular combination of somatic markers activated by the outcomes of that
alternative, but only within the specific framing of that decision and at that particular
time (Slovic et al.2004; Kuykendall & Keating, 1990), . This construction of preferences
is in the forward direction, with an affect-based preference for one alternative or another
being constructed from past experience of outcomes, although not through a purely
mathematical combination of stable preferences. This theory has some support from
empirical findings (Charpentier et al., 2016; Schlösser et al., 2013) and a basis in choice
construction models such as the diffusion decision model and leaky competing
accumulator theory (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001), This system
is low-effort and experience-based, and although prone to bias, often leads to effective
decisions (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Slovic et al., 2004). General (i.e., related to the
decision as a whole) negative affect can arise from the level of conflict in a difficult
trade-off (Carpenter et al., 2016), threats to closely held goals like survival (Luce, 1998),
or viscerally unpleasant decision outcomes themselves (Slovic et al.). These aversive
feelings can alter or disrupt the decision making process (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Luce,
1998).
Construction of preferences can also flow in the other direction. Under coherence
shifting, after coming to some initial preference for one alternative, patients would
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change their subjective feelings towards outcomes and the importance of attributes such
that the initially preferred treatment becomes more attractive and other alternatives
become less attractive (Simon et al., 2004). Patients who display high coherence shifting
reduce some of the negative affect or arousal arising from a difficult trade-off decision.
Patients who do less coherence shifting do not reduce negative affect and report higher
subjective effort required to reach a decision (Carpenter et al., 2016).
Definitions of Affect in the Current Study
Affect is usually defined as a short-term emotional state or mood. Affective
reactions refer to specific short-term emotions that are evoked by some stimuli in the
environment. Medical treatment decisions may lead to longer-term emotional distress,
which can represent more debilitating states (Carpenter & Niedenthal, 2017). Due to the
short duration and simulated nature of the current tasks, however, such long-term
emotions were not examined.
This leads to an important note about terminology. Throughout this project,
separate terms are used to represent affect towards different aspects of a multi-attribute
decision: Affect towards outcomes, feelings towards alternatives, and aversive feelings
towards the decision as a whole. These are used for the purposes of clarity, to
differentiate between the variables being measured. All of these descriptors are still
meant to represent affect, or short-term emotional states or reactions. Another concern is
the depth of affect measures. Schlösser et al. (2013) measured affect towards all
outcomes and alternatives in their study on three dimensions: Positivity, Arousal, and
Dominance. These dimensions have been shown in past research to account for a
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substantial amount of variance (> 50%) in decision-making and preferences (Mehrabian,
1995). They have also been found through factor analysis to contribute the majority of
the variance in other, more specific measures of emotion. Affect positivity, or valence, is
a simple positive or negative reaction, and is the kind typically discussed in public risk
perception (Lerner & Kentner, 2001) risky decision-making (Charpentier et al., 2016),
and activation-based decision models (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). The arousal dimension
represents a level of activity or alertness and can lead to either avoiding or seeking an
action depending on the associated positivity. Many outcomes in health decision are
unpleasant, so avoidance is more likely (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio., 1996).
Arousal is also the only affect dimension that can be reliably associated with
physiological arousal measures, such as skin conductance (Figner & Murphy, 2011).
Dominance represents a spectrum of perceived control over a situation versus feeling
controlled by external influences (Mehrabian). Dominance is strongly related to health
decision-making, as perceived control or self-efficacy is considered essential for adopting
and maintaining health-promoting behaviors (Strecher, McEvoy DeVellis, Becker, &
Rosenstock, 1986; Weinstein & Sandman, 2002). Outside of these dimensions,
Carpenter et al. (2016) included unpleasantness, stress, anxiety, and feeling conflicted to
provide a broader measure of aversive feelings.
Ideally, affect towards both alternatives and outcomes would be measured with a
multifaceted measure, as was done by Schlösser et al. (2013). Unfortunately, the larger
number of outcomes used in these coherence shifting tasks (8 vs. their 4) and the repeated
measures necessary to demonstrate coherence shifting (pre-, mid-, and post-choice)
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makes this impractical. Charpentier et al. (2016) were able to find a reliable predictive
relationship between affect and choice using one-dimensional positivity (happiness)
measures. Thus, the following studies will include one-dimensional (positivity) affect
ratings for constructs that must be measured repeatedly (outcomes), and multidimensional measures of affect for more complex mediating affective responses (feelings
towards alternatives) and those that are compared to physiological arousal (aversive
feelings towards the decision as a whole).
Purpose and Hypotheses
This research project will examine the role of emotion and direction of preference
change in difficult multi-attribute health trade-off decisions. Decisions will involve
choosing between two disease treatments that are conflicted, with each treatment
(alternative) having outcomes that are superior on some attributes and inferior on other
attributes. The most important questions addressed in this research focus on the role of
affect in the decision making process. The relationship between affect and choice was
examined in two directions. The first is predictive, where affective reactions predict
choice:
Hypothesis 1: In Experiments 1 and 2, choice will best be predicted by a model
including affect towards outcomes outside of the decision context (pre-choice)
and feelings towards alternatives within the context of a decision (mid-choice)
such that lower ratings of negative affect towards outcomes related to an
alternative and less negative feelings towards an alternative will increase its
likelihood of being chosen. This model will be more predictive of choice than
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models where choice is predicted only by affect towards outcomes, only by
attribute importance (approximating Lexicographic/Elimination by Aspects), or
by a linear combination of outcome affect and attribute importance (Weighted
Additive).
According to evidence from a related risky decision paradigm, models using
simple positive/negative affect towards outcomes (Charpentier et al., 2016) and multidimensional feelings about alternatives (Schlösser et al., 2013) are the most predictive of
choice. These models are not improved by including additional rational factors like the
probability of outcomes. This method, which is simpler than weighted additive, also
aligns with the choice-construction models, where activation and inhibition towards
alternatives come from the difference between outcomes rather than a focus on important
attributes, e.g., Ratcliff & McKoon’s (2008) diffusion decision model.
In contrast to the model above, if models relying on stable, revealed preferences
are correct, then attribute importance ratings and affect towards outcomes measured
independently of any specific alternatives or decision should be predictive of choice. For
example, if affect is the mechanism underlying utility ratings, as suggested by Peters
(2006), the weighted additive strategy suggests that choice will be predicted by a person’s
outcome affect ratings multiplied by attribute importance, whereas Lexicographic choice
should only be predicted by attribute importance and a positive or negative sign based on
which alternative is “winning” on that attribute.
These predictive analyses, which involve comparing affect-based models
consistent with coherence shifting to more mathematically rational models, are important
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to investigate because previous studies of coherence shifting either manipulated outcome
utilities to make one choice more attractive (Simon et al., 2004), did not conduct
predictive analysis (Carpenter et al., 2016), or did not compare models that follow from
different theories (Simon & Spiller, 2016).
In addition to affect towards outcomes predicting choice, influence may occur in
the opposite direction. Once an early preference for one specific treatment alternative
emerges, preferences towards alternatives and outcomes should shift to support a final
choice.
Hypothesis 2: In Experiments 1 and 2, preferences towards decision information
(outcome affect and attribute importance) will change during decision making
based on time and final treatment choice in order to make the chosen alternative
more attractive. I hypothesized a strong form of the coherence shifting, in which
ratings of outcome affect for the chosen treatment will increase from before a
decision to the middle of the decision, while ratings for the non-chosen treatment
decrease over the same interval. Similarly, importance ratings for attributes
favoring the chosen treatment will increase from before a decision to the middle
of the decision, while attributes favoring the non-chosen treatment will decrease
over the same interval.
This hypothesis relies on a strong interpretation of coherence shifting, where the
slope of the line showing change in affect—or importance ratings—over time is positive
or negative depending on whether the outcomes come from—or the attributes favor—the
chosen treatment vs. the non-chosen treatment, respectively. In a more general form of
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coherence shifting, the slope of the line showing change in outcome affect ratings over
time for the chosen treatment will be greater than the corresponding slope for the nonchosen treatment. Similarly, the slope of the line showing change in importance ratings
over time for attributes favoring the chosen treatment will be greater than the
corresponding slope for attributes favoring the non-chosen treatment.
This hypothesis holds that coherence shifting, as demonstrated with a job offer
task (Carpenter et al., 2016; Simon et al., 2004; Simon et al., 2008; Simon & Spiller,
2016), will also occur in health decision making tasks. To test whether this hypothesis fits
the connectionist constraint-satisfaction model proposed by Simon et al., preferences
must be measured at pre-, mid-, and post-decision times. This is important because if
preferences were only shown to change between pre-decision and post-decision
measures, that could be attributed to theoretical accounts of changes in preferences taking
place after a decision, such as cognitive dissonance (Simon & Holyoak, 2002).
If preference changes do not occur until the post-choice stage, this would not be
compatible with coherence shifting as an emotional regulation function that occurs during
the decision process. This proposed function and findings by Carpenter et al. (2016)
suggest the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: In both experiments, as overall coherence shifting from the prechoice to mid-choice time increases, aversive feelings towards the decision as a
whole will decrease. Also, as the extent of overall coherence shifting increases,
the extent to which physiological arousal decreases will increase, particularly
between mid- and post- choice times. In other words, coherence shifting and
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arousal decrease will show a dose-response relationship in Experiment 2
(Abelson, 1995).
Carpenter et al. (2016) found evidence that a difficult trade-off decision with
relatively emotionally-neutral outcomes and attributes led to aversive feelings during the
decision process. In an experiment using physiological arousal as an index of aversive
feelings, they found that the pattern of arousal over time was dependent on the extent of
coherence shifting engaged in by participants. Those who shifted their preferences
strongly over time showed a reduction in physiological arousal between the mid- and
post-decision times, whereas those who did less shifting of preferences did not reduce
their arousal.
Carpenter et al. found that aversive feelings arise from the level of conflict
(distance between outcomes) within a decision but did not specify any difference based
on the context or content (attributes, outcomes) of the decision. Given that health
treatment decisions are likely to have higher aversive feelings from the decision context,
this effect should be more pronounced in health decisions and should depend on the
content of specific health decisions:
Hypothesis 4: Tasks with attributes that threaten higher-level goals (Experiment
1) and tasks with more severe physical outcomes (Experiment 2) will lead to
stronger aversive feelings towards the overall decision and higher physiological
arousal compared to tasks with less severe outcomes and which threaten lowerlevel goals.
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Difficult health decisions differ from relatively emotionally-neutral tasks such as
job selection in a number of ways that may affect emotional salience. Aversive feelings
might arise from attributes that affect higher-level goals like safety and survival (Luce,
1998), physical outcomes that are often visceral and easily imaginable, and outcomes that
predict near-term physical discomfort or pain (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Loewenstein et
al., 2001). These negative emotions are likely to increase with the severity of physical
outcomes, such that a relatively mild health decision will be less pleasant than a neutral
task such as job selection, and a serious health decision with severe consequences will be
less pleasant than that. This should lead to stronger aversive feelings towards the overall
decision in these scenarios and higher physiological arousal when presented with more
emotionally salient tasks. Experiment 1 will compare two tasks that threaten lower- or
higher-level goals and Experiment 2 will compare two tasks threatening the same highlevel goals but with different levels of outcome unpleasantness.
Exploratory Analysis. In addition to negative emotion, it important to know if
coherence shifting becomes more or less common as a decision becomes more serious
and if the magnitude of coherence shifting changes as outcome emotional salience and
the level of goals threatened increase. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict this based on
available empirical evidence. Carpenter et al. (2016) found that people depleted of
executive resources by a separate frustrating task showed lower coherence shifting, but
these findings do not extend to the effect of feelings arising from the decision itself.
Thus, how differences in disease seriousness influence coherence shifting was examined
in an exploratory manner.
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Carpenter et al. also found that coherence shifting correlated with existing
measures of emotional regulation. This analysis was repeated in the interests of
converging evidence. Additionally, increasing confidence that a person’s final decision
was correct may be a mechanism by which coherence shifting reduces negative emotion.
Final decision confidence and changes in confidence were examined for a relationship
with coherence shifting.
Overview of Experimental Studies. These hypotheses were investigated using
two experiments. Experiment 1 expanded upon original research on coherence shifting by
comparing an emotionally-neutral decision task (job offer selection) with an emotionladen health trade-off decision (a serious disease treatment decision) that threatened
lower- and higher-level goals respectively. Experiment 2 utilized objective, physiological
measures to examine changes in emotion during coherence shifting with two difficult
health trade-offs differing in severity (unpleasantness) of outcomes. Both of these
experiments required the creation of balanced, difficult, emotionally-salient health tradeoff stimuli, which were created using a pilot study.
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PILOT STUDY: TRADE-OFF DEVELOPMENT
In order to simulate a difficult trade-off decision, it was necessary to create
scenarios that included two alternatives with outcomes that were balanced on a number of
attributes. Simon et al. (2004) accomplished this by creating two fictional companies,
Bonnie’s Best and Splendor, selecting four attributes common to job selection, and
providing outcomes that were better or worse for either company. The outcomes chosen
were often objectively better or worse than some moderate value (e.g., industry average
salary.) Some decision making studies describe these outcomes as conflicted or
negatively correlated: Every outcome that is positive for one job is negative for the other,
as can be seen in Table 1.
Creating difficult health trade-off scenarios for the current project entailed
additional challenges beyond those faced by Simon et al. (2004). This project examined
bi-directional influences between preferences and choices, rather than solely focusing on
choice affecting preferences. This means that participants must be free to choose either
alternative using the same outcome information, but without overwhelmingly favoring
one alternative. This required a more precise balancing of outcome favorability or utility
between alternatives. In order to be a difficult trade-off decision, differences on attributes
must be large enough to not be trivial (e.g., $5 vs. $7 co-pay would be trivial) while also
avoiding individual outcomes that are so extreme that choice would be guided by them
entirely (e.g., death as a side effect).
It was also necessary to balance outcomes across multiple attributes. Health
treatments are complex and multi-faceted, and many of these attributes threaten very
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closely-held goals and have outcomes that are not easily comparable. Thus, even if two
health treatments are moderately different on price and moderately different in 5-year
survival rate, the individual outcomes on those measures must also be somehow
comparable or one attribute will become irrelevant. One potential solution to this problem
discussed by Peters (2006) is affect as common currency, or the idea that people can
compare many dissimilar possible outcomes using their affective reaction to each
outcome rather than any kind of quantitative or reflective process. Thus, the purpose of
the pilot study was to determine outcomes of real medical treatments that provided
approximately equal affective reactions. In order to create a tradeoff that is predictably
difficult across participants, affect towards these outcomes must also be generally shared
across individuals.
In the pilot study, affect towards outcomes was assessed using a modified version
of Thurstone’s (1928) method of equal-appearing intervals. The original purpose of this
method was to quantify attitudes. To do this, Thurstone would identify a large number of
qualitative, textual statements about a topic (e.g., religion), and then ask judges to sort the
statements into numbered piles ranging from least favorable to most favorable towards
the concept. Statements that were placed under a single number reliably by several judges
could be assigned that number as a value, and statements corresponding to consecutive
values could be used to construct a ranked scale. A person could then give yes/no
agreement to items on this scale, and the numerical values of their “Yes” items could be
averaged to quantify their attitude.
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Method
The goal of this pilot was to develop two difficult multi-attribute health treatment
trade-off decisions, similar to the job offer task developed by Simon et al. (2004). These
include treatments for a mild disease with visceral but moderate negative outcomes and
treatments for a serious disease with severe negative outcomes. First, I identified real
diseases that can lead to difficult trade-off decisions, including Type 1 diabetes, Crohn’s
disease, and malignant melanoma. Information about treatments and symptoms for these
diseases was collected from reputable online sources and medical literature (Tiziani,
2017). Next, information about these treatments was separated from original sources into
lists of outcomes for six attributes: side effects, administration method, out-of-pocket
cost, duration of symptoms, efficacy, and mortality.
Participants. Participants included 62 Clemson University students (age M = 19;
87% female) recruited through Clemson’s undergraduate psychology research system.
Participants were treated in accordance with APA ethical guidelines.
Procedures. Participants completed six online card sort procedures following
Thurstone’s procedure with a separate card sort for each attribute. They sorted a list of
outcomes based on either their immediate emotional reaction (for side effects) or how
unpleasant it would be to experience them (for all other scales), placing all outcomes in
categories ranging from 1 “Not at all unpleasant” to 7 “Most unpleasant.” Participants
then provided importance ratings for each of the six attributes towards any treatment
decision on a scale 5-point scale from 1 (“Not at all important”) to 5 (“Extremely
important”).
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Results
Following guidelines provided by Thurstone (1928), outcomes were sorted
according to their median affect value to find outcomes that represent a similar amount of
unpleasantness. The other criterion for selecting outcomes was that the unpleasantness
ratings showed relatively low variability, as outcomes with high variability in affect
ratings would not generalize well to the experimental studies. Attributes were selected as
follows. Attribute importance ratings on a 1 to 5 scale were highest for mortality (M =
4.71, SD = 0.64), followed by efficacy (M=4.29, SD=0.69), out-of-pocket costs (M=3.97,
SD=0.94), side effects (M=3.65, SD=0.83), duration of symptoms (M=3.52, SD=0.84),
and administration (M=2.94, SD=0.92). Given the higher importance of mortality rates
versus other attributes and the subjective perceptions described below, mortality
outcomes were discarded.
To construct a trade-off decision with sufficient differences between alternatives,
outcomes with equivalent affect ratings were grouped, and then outcome groups 2 to 3
affect units apart were compared side-by-side. Based on this initial comparison, a serious
disease treatment decision with serious outcomes was constructed using outcomes with
low variability that had been rated 4 or 6 on unpleasantness (2 units apart). A mild
disease treatment decision was constructed using outcomes rated 2 and 4 on
unpleasantness (2 units). The tradeoffs for mild and serious disease are presented in
Tables 2 (Mild) and 3 (Serious). These trade-off decisions were used in Experiments 1
and 2.
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The scenarios presented to participants included a longer textual explanation of
each outcome in addition to the summary table below.
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Table 1: Difficult job offer trade-off. Reproduced from Simon et al., 2004, with salary
values adjusted from Simon & Spiller (2016). (+) and (-) indicate favorable and
unfavorable outcomes. Participants did not see these symbols.
Splendor

Bonnie's Best

$49,2500 (-)

$51,000 (+)

Office

Private office (+)

Noisy cubicle (-)

Vacation Package

2 weeks (-)

2 weeks plus retreat (+)

Commute

Short (18 min) (+)

Long (40 min) (-)

Salary (Industry average =
$50,000)
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Table 2: Treatment attributes and outcomes for a mild disease with moderate
consequences. Median unpleasantness scores (“Unpleas.” ,interquartile range in
parentheses) are shown to the left (Treatment T) or right (Treatment N) of each outcome.
Participants did not see these scores. Higher numbers are more unpleasant.
Unpleas.

Administration method

Unpleas.

(IQR)

Treatment T

Treatment N

(IQR)

2 (1)

One pill 3 times a

One intramuscular

4 (2)

day for 14 days

shot, then one pill 2
times a day for 7 days

Side effects

4(1)

Nausea

Chills

2 (0.25)

Efficacy (% of people

2 (1)

87%

63%

4 (1)

4 (1)

14 days

1 day

2 (0)

cured of disease 1 week
after treatment ends)
Duration of Symptoms
(How long you'll feel
disease symptoms.)
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Table 3: Treatment attributes and outcomes for a serious disease with severe
consequences. Median unpleasantness scores (Unpleas., interquartile range in
parentheses) are shown to the left (Treatment K) or right (Treatment M) of each outcome.
Participants did not see these scores. Higher numbers are more unpleasant.
Unpleas.

Administration method

Side effects

Unpleas.

(IQR)

Treatment K

Treatment M

(IQR)

4 (2)

One intramuscular

One injection

6 (2)

shot, then one pill 2

into the spinal

times a day for 7 days

fluid

Seizure (50% chance)

Nausea (50%

6 (1)

4 (1)

chance)
Efficacy (% of people

4 (1.25)

67%

51%

6 (1)

4 (1.25)

7 days, in hospital

10 days (no

6 (1)

cured of disease 1 week
after treatment ends)
Duration of Symptoms
(How long you'll feel

hospitalization)

disease symptoms.)
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EXPERIMENT 1: EMOTIONALLY NEURTRAL VERSUS MEDICAL
TREATMENT DECISIONS
Experiment 1 examined participant decision-making in both a relatively
emotionally-neutral tradeoff decision (job offer selection) adapted from Simon et al.
(2004) and a medical treatment tradeoff decision threatening higher-level goals and with
more emotionally laden outcomes (treatments for a serious disease). These two tasks
were selected to produce strong differences in negative affect from decision information
(outcomes, attributes) between tasks. This experiment had three purposes. The first was
to examine the predictive validity of affect on final choice in both tasks. The second was
to determine if coherence shifting occurs in both a replication of the original task used for
this research as well as a novel medical treatment decision. Third, the two tasks were
compared on subjective measures of aversive feelings from the decision and for the
magnitude of coherence shifting which had occurred. Participants completed both tasks to
allow for individual (within-subjects) comparisons in decision-making.
Method
Participants. A statistical power analysis was performed for sample size
estimation using data from Simon’s et al. (2004) second job offer experiment, using the
critical choice-by-time interaction (r = .404). With an alpha = .05 and power = 0.80, the
projected sample size needed to reproduce this interaction effect size (GPower 3.1.9.2)
was N = 83. For logistic regression, a minimum sample of N = 140 would be required for
the most complex proposed model (weighted additive; Vittinghoff & MuCulloch, 2007,
van Smeden et al., 2016).
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Participants included 125 Clemson University psychology students (Age: M =
19.05, SD = 1.41, 60.8% female). Participants were treated according to APA ethical
guidelines under the supervision of Clemson University’s Institutional Review Board.
Design. The overall experiment followed a 2 (decision task: job offer, serious
disease treatment) by 3 (measurement time: pre-choice, mid-choice, post-choice) withinsubjects design, although analysis focused on pre- and mid-choice times. Final choice
between alternatives for each decision task (Serious disease: Treatment K or M; Job
offer: Bonnie’s Best vs. Splendor) was dichotomous and was used as a between-subjects
predictor variable or a criterion depending upon the analysis. Analysis for each decision
task was conducted separately. The use of different attributes and outcomes between
tasks and the number of dependent variables would make meaningful direct comparisons
of shifting in preferences over time difficult.
Dependent variables measured at all three time points included affect towards
outcomes (8 per task) and subjective attribute importance (4 per task). Other dependent
variables included mid-choice feelings towards alternatives (valence, arousal, and
dominance toward each alternative), aversive feelings from the decision as a whole (4
items), and final choice for each task. These were measured at (or shortly after, for final
choice) the mid-choice time period. (A mid-choice initial leaning and confidence for both
leaning and final choice were also recorded.)
Measures. Affect (valence) towards outcomes was rated on a 10-point scale of
predicted happiness ranging from -5 (“Extremely unhappy”) to +5 (“Extremely happy”),
excluding 0. This replaced the desirability scale used in prior coherence shifting research
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(Carpenter et al., 2016; Simon et al., 2004) with the direct measure of affect used by
Charpentier et al. (2016). Desirability is conceptually strongly related to affect towards an
object and can directly influence behavior in a similar manner (Peters, 2006). Subjective
attribute importance was measured using a 9-point scale of importance ranging from 1
(“no weight”) to 9 (“maximum weight”) (Simon et al.).
Feelings towards alternatives were measured using a short, 3-item SelfAssessment Manikin developed by Lang (1980) and Bradley and Lang (1994). The SelfAssessment Manikin is a rapid self-report assessment of three dimensions of affect:
positivity (valence), arousal, and dominance. Each dimension was rated on a 9-point
pictorial semantic-differential scale, where participants selected one of the 5 images or
the 4 midpoints between the images for an intermediate value (See Figure 1). Following
Schlösser et al. (2013), I reversed the Positivity dimension images so that “desirable”
ratings (positive, calm, and in control) for all three dimensions were on the right.
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Figure 1. The Self-Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994). This is used to rate affective reaction
dimensions of Positivity (top panel), Arousal (middle panel) and Dominance (bottom panel). The Positivity
scale has been reversed from Bradley and Lang.

Aversive feelings towards the decision (affect) were measured with an averseness
index utilized by Carpenter et al. (2016), including four 9-point scales using the terms
Anxious, Stressed, Unpleasant, and Conflicted. These ranged from 1 (“Not at all
anxious”) to 5 (“Moderately Anxious”) to 9 (“Extremely anxious”), except substituting
the other emotions for “Anxious” in their scales. Final choice was a dichotomous
measure of the alternative chosen.
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Ratings of outcome affect ratings and attribute importance were collected at all
three time points. Feelings towards alternatives and aversive feelings towards the
decision were only collected at the mid-choice time. Final choice was collected between
the mid-choice and post-choice ratings. For more details on timing, see the procedures.
Participants also completed several demographic and control questions that may
impact emotions towards outcomes or alternatives. These included direct or close
personal experience with the disease used in the serious disease task, as prior experience
should increase the strength of affective response (Slovic et al., 2004; Bechara and
Damasio, 2005). Fear of injection was assessed using a single-item measure adapted from
the Marks & Matthews (1979), as the health decision task involved injections.
Participants also reported their health insurance status, as Wong et al. (2013) found that
cancer patients prioritize monetary cost over survival (and vice versa) depending on
insurance availability and income. Participants completed two existing measures of
emotional regulation strategy: the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross &
John 2003) and the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ; Gross & John, 1998).
Both of these scales use a 7-point Likert scale of agreement. The ERQ consists of 10
statements about how a participant controls their emotions and is divided into two
subscales; Cognitive Reappraisal (e.g., “I control my emotions by changing the way I
think about the situation I’m in.”) and Expressive Suppression (e.g., “I control my
emotions by not expressing them.”). The BEQ consists of 20 items assessing the extent to
which the participant expresses positive emotion (Positive Expressivity) and negative
emotions (Negative Expressivity) in their daily life, and the strength of these expressions
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(Impulse Strength). The BEQ was calculated as three separate subscales as well as an
overall expressivity score.
Procedure. Experimental sessions took place a laboratory with 1 to 4
participants. All stimuli were presented through MediaLab (v2012). Participants
completed both the job offer task and the serious disease task in a single session, and
were randomly assigned to complete either the job offer or disease task first. Participants
completed a practice Self-Assessment Manikin scale before the first task.
Job Task. The job offer task was adapted from Simon et al. (2004). During the
first, pre-choice phase of the task, participants were presented with information entitled
“Waiting for a Job Offer,” where participants were asked to imagine that they are about
to gradate and will be interviewing for a job. They were presented with 11 possible
outcomes of job offers and rated each one in terms of their predicted happiness or
unhappiness upon choosing it, i.e., outcome affect ratings. These included the 8 outcomes
used in Table 1 plus 3 distractor outcomes, in list form. Participants were then presented
with the four attributes available in Table 1 and asked to rate their importance in possible
job offers, i.e., attribute importance ratings. These 12 measures were pre-choice ratings,
outside of any decision context. No alternatives or decision matrix were present at this
time.
During the second, mid-choice phase, participants were presented with job offers
from two large fictional retail-store chains, Splendor and Bonnie’s Best, using the
decision information available in Table 1. These jobs were described as similar in all
other attributes (e.g., promotion opportunities, size, and stability). This information was
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presented in both paragraph and matrix form (as in Table 1), with explanations of each
outcome in the paragraphs. After being told to consider all aspects of the job offers,
participants were instructed that a third company is considering buying one company or
the other, so they were not able to choose between jobs until later. Participants then rated
their predicted affect towards the 8 outcomes and provided importance weights for the 4
attributes. For each job offer, participants were asked to imagine how they would feel if
they selected that job and rate those feelings by completing a Self-Assessment Manikin.
After this, they were be instructed to keep the two job offers in mind and complete the
four-item index of aversive feelings towards the decision, as used in Carpenter et al.,
(2016).
Following this was the final choice and third, post-choice phase. Participants were
instructed that the third company would not buy either of the companies in the decision,
and that they should continue with the choice. Participants were shown the job offer
information again and chose a job offer. Participants rated their affect towards the 8
outcomes and importance weights for the four attributes.
Serious Disease Task. Timing and measures for the serious disease task were the
same as for the job offer task. The structure of disease task was adapted from the job
offer task used by Simon et al. (2004). The pre-choice information for the serious disease
task asked participants to imagine that they had been diagnosed with a strain of malaria
after a mosquito bite and that a doctor would soon be with them to talk about treatment
options. Malaria was selected from diseases rated in the pilot due to some participants not
knowing of more common diseases (e.g., MRSA, tetanus). Participants then provided
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ratings for the 8 outcomes and four attributes in Table 3, as well as three distractor
outcomes selected from moderately unpleasant pilot items. Participants were presented
with the treatments from Table 3 in both paragraph and matrix form, along with
instructions that they were being asked to take part in the decision process (a shared
decision) due to the trade-offs in costs and benefits of the two treatments. This included a
delay instruction stating that the participants would have to wait to decide because the
doctor was still waiting for laboratory bloodwork that could prevent them from taking
one or both treatments. The participants then completed mid-choice measures. At the
choice and post-choice times, participants were instructed that the blood tests were ready
and that both treatments were still available, and then selected a treatment and provided
and post-choice ratings.
Participants completed demographic and external influence measures after
completing both tasks. Participants were fully debriefed including instructions that all
treatments discussed were fictional before being released.
Past research (Simon et al., 2008; Carpenter et al., 2016) included unrelated
reasoning tasks between each measurement time as distractors in order to reduce memory
for previous ratings. Such distractors were omitted from Experiment 1 in both tasks due
to a software error, but were implemented in Experiment 2.
Results
Statistics. Generalized eta-squared was used for MANOVA and ANOVA effect
sizes, as partial eta-squared may overestimate effect sizes in repeated-measures designs
(Bakeman, 2005). According to Cohen’s (1988, p. 286) conventions for ηG2, 0.26 and
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above represents a large effect, 0.13 is a medium effect, 0.02 is a small effect, and less
than 0.02 is negligible. Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973) was used for
predictive model fit as described below. Lower AIC indicates better fit. Using
conventions from Burnham and Anderson (2004), models which have a fit within 2 AIC
of the best-fitting model have substantial support, while models more than 10 AIC below
the best-fitting model have essentially no support.
Predicting Choice: Serious Disease Task (Experiment 1). A separate
predictive analysis was conducted on each task. Seven participants were eliminated from
predictive analysis for the serious disease task as multivariate outliers on all predictor and
outcome variables, resulting in a sample size for the disease task of N = 119. Treatment K
was chosen by 77 participants (64.7%), and Treatment M was chosen by 42 participants
(35.3%). Hypothesis 1 predicted that a model including pre-choice affect towards
outcomes and mid-choice feelings towards alternatives would be the best predictor of
choice (Model 2.1 in Table 4), when compared to other models based on outcome affect
alone (1.0), attribute importance alone (3.0), or a linear combination of outcome affect
and the related attribute importance (3.1, 4.0, 4.1). Multiple logistic regression analyses
were conducted for several models to examine the predictive ability of different decisionmaking models for this task. See Appendix B for full model descriptions. Model omnibus
statistical tests, effect sizes, and fit information for the serious disease tasks are available
in Table 5. Models were evaluated individually rather than in a stepwise logistic
regression because, due to the selection of predictors from multiple decision strategies,
not all models were nested. Models that significantly predicted choice were Model 2.0
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(Mid-choice feelings towards alternatives; χ2 (6) = 90.39, p < .001), Model 2.1 (Midchoice feelings and pre-choice outcome affect; χ2 (14) = 107.41, p < .001), Model 3.1
(Lexicographic; χ2 (2) = 19.65, p < .001), and Model 4.1 (Weighted additive with
interaction; χ2 (6) = 33.85, p = .027). No other models significantly predicted choice.
Models were compared for fit using AIC (Cohen et al., 2003). AIC approximates
variance accounted for but favors more parsimonious models, with lower AIC values
indicating better fit (Akaike, 1973). Model 2.1, including pre-choice affect towards
outcomes and mid-choice feelings for alternatives, showed the best fit (AIC = 76.24).
Models that are within 2 AIC of the best-fitting model are also considered to have
substantial support. Model 2.0 (AIC = 77.26), containing only mid-choice feelings, is
equally predictive of choice. No other models provide substantial fit. This only partially
supported Hypothesis 1, which predicted that pre-choice affect with mid-choice feelings
(Model 2.1) would out-predict mid-choice feelings alone (Model 2.0).
Regression coefficients and odds ratios for predictors in the serious disease task
are presented in Appendix C (Tables C1.1 to C1.3). In both models 2.0 and 2.1, all six
mid-choice ratings of feelings towards alternatives (positivity, arousal, and dominance)
significantly predicted choice. Positivity most strongly predicted choice. In Model 2.1,
participant became 7.53 times more likely to choose Treatment K for every 1 point
increase in positivity towards K and became 4.55 (1/0.22) times more likely to choose
Treatment M for every 1 point increase in positivity towards M. In model 2.1, pre-choice
affect towards spinal injections (Treatment M administration) and 10 days without
hospitalization (Treatment M duration) also significantly predicted choice. For every 1

42

point increase in affect towards spinal injections, participants became 1.77 times more
likely to choose Treatment K. For every 1 point increase in affect towards 10 days
without hospitalization, participants became 1.67 (1/0.60) times more likely to choose
Treatment M.
Predicting Choice: Job Task. Thirteen participants were eliminated from
predictive analysis for the job task as multivariate outliers, resulting in a sample size for
the job task of N = 112. Only one participant was an outlier on both the serious disease
and job tasks. Splendor was chosen by 70 participants (62.5%) and Bonnie’s Best was
chosen by 42 participants (37.5%). Model omnibus statistical tests, effect size, and fit
information for the job task are available in Table 6. All models significantly predicted
choice (p < .01) except for Models 3.0 (Attribute importance) and Model 3.1
(Lexicographic). Model 2.0, including only mid-choice feelings towards alternative, was
the best-fitting model (AIC = 63.15). This only partially supports Hypothesis 1, which
predicted that pre-choice affect ratings would improve prediction above mid-choice
feelings, as in Model 2.1. Based on comparison of AIC, no other models provide
substantial fit. Regression coefficients and odds ratios for predictors in the job-choice
task are presented in Appendix C, Tables C2.1 to C2.3. In model 2.0, all six mid-choice
ratings of feelings towards alternatives (positivity, arousal, and dominance) significantly
predicted job choice. Positivity most strongly predicted choice. In this model, participants
became 4.14 times more likely to choose Splendor for every 1 point increase in positivity
towards Splendor. Participants became 2.63 (1/0.38) times more likely to choose
Bonnie’s Best for every 1 point increase in positivity towards Bonnie’s Best.
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Table 4: Schematic versions of theory-based models and parameters. Hypothesis 2 states
that Model 2.1 would be the most predictive of choice.
Model

Predictors

Critical Parameters

1.0: Affect:

Affect for 8 outcomes

β1-8(Affect A1-4, B1-4)

Charpentier et al.

(alternatives A and B each
have 4 outcomes)

2.0: Mid-choice

Feelings for alternative A

β1PosA + β2ArousalA + β3DomA

feelings only

+ feelings for alternative B

+ β4PosB + β5ArousalB + β6DomB

2.1: Affect:

Affect for 8 outcomes

β1-8(Affect A1-4, B1-4)

Schlösser et al.

+ feelings for alternative A

+ β9PosA + β10ArousalA + β11DomA

+ feelings for alternative B

+ β12PosB + β13ArousalB + β14DomB

3.0: Attribute-based

Importance for 4 attributes

β1-4 (ImpAttribute1-4)

3.1: Lexicographic

Affect for 2 outcomes on high-

β1 (AffectA,most imp.) + β2 (AffectB,most imp.)

importance attribute
4.0: W.Add (Main

Affect for 8 outcomes

β1-8(Affect A1-4, B1-4)

effects)

+ Importance for 4 attributes

+ β9-12(ImpAttribute1-4)

4.1 : W.Add

Affect for 8 outcomes

β1-8(Affect A1-4, B1-4)

(Interaction)*

+ Importance for 4 attributes

+ β9-12(ImpAttribute1-4)

+ Affect x Importance for A

+ β13-16((Affect A1-4) x (ImpAttribute1-4))

+ Affect x Importance for B

+ β17-20((AffectB1-4) x (ImpAttribute1-4))

See Appendix B for a detailed explanation of models. Pos = positivity, Dom = dominance, and Imp =
importance. * Interaction is only between the outcome and its corresponding attribute (e.g.,
ImportAttribute1(Side effects) x AffectA1(Seizure), ImportAttribute2 x AffectA2, etc.). most imp. = most important
attribute. W.Add = Weighted Additive.
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Table 5: Model statistical tests and fit for the Study 1 Serious Disease task.
Log

McFadden’s

McFadden's

Model

Likelihood

χ2 (df)

P

Pseudo-R2

R2 adjusted

AIC

0 Null

-76.82

-

-

0

0

161.8

1.0 Affect (Charpentier)

-71.62

10.42 (8)

0.237

0.0678

-0.036

161.23

2.0 Affect (Mid-choice)

-31.63

90.39** (6)

< .001

0.588

0.510

77.26

2.1 Affect (Schlösser)

-23.12

107.40 **(14)

< .001

0.699

0.517

76.24

3.0 Attribute-based

-72.57

8.52 (4)

0.074

0.055

0.003

155.13

3.1 Lexicographic

-67.00

19.65 **(2)

< .001

0.128

0.102

140.00

4.0 W.Add (Main effects)

-68.30

17.05 (12)

0.148

0.111

-0.045

162.60

4.1 W.Add (Interaction)

-59.90

33.85* (20)

0.027

0.220

-0.040

161.80

N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. W.Add = Weighted Additive.

Table 6: Predictive model statistical tests and fit for the Study 1 Job task.
Log

McFadden’s

McFadden's

Model

Likelihood

χ2 (df)

P

Pseudo-R2

R2 adjusted

AIC

0 Null

-74.10

-

-

0.000

0.000

150.19

1.0 Affect (Charpentier)

-61.58

25.02* (8)

0.002

0.169

0.061

141.17

2.0 Affect (Mid-choice)

-42.52

63.15** (6)

< .001

0.426

0.345

99.05

2.1 Affect (Schlösser)

-37.92

72.36 **(14)

< .001

0.488

0.299

105.83

3.0 Attribute-based

-72.84

2.51 (2)

0.285

0.017

-0.010

151.68

3.1 Lexicographic

-71.52

5.16 (4)

0.271

0.035

-0.019

153.03

4.0 W.Add (Main effects)

-58.84

30.52* (12)

0.002

0.206

0.044

143.67

4.1 W.Add (Interaction)

-51.83

44.52* (20)

0.001

0.300

0.031

145.67

N = 112. * p < .05, ** p < .001. AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. W.Add = Weighted

Additive.
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Coherence Shifting: Serious Disease Task (Experiment 1).
Serious Disease: Importance. Mean comparisons for coherence shifting were also
conducted separately for each task. The strong form of the coherence shifting Hypothesis
(#2) predicted that attributes favoring the chosen treatment increase from before the
decision to the middle of the decision, while attributes favoring the non-chosen treatment
would decrease over the same interval. The general coherence shifting hypothesis only
predicted a slope difference for the change in ratings over time rather than a positive vs.
negative slope. These analyses did not include the post-decision data because changes
between pre- and mid-choice times must be present if changes in scores are caused by
coherence shifting, as opposed to cognitive dissonance.
In the context of the two treatments in the serious disease decision task, if the strong
form of coherence shifting occurs, these changes should follow opposite patterns as
follows. Participants who selected K should increase their importance ratings for
attributes favoring K (Administration method, Efficacy) between the pre- and the midchoice periods and decrease their importance ratings for attributes favoring M (Side
effects, Duration) over the same interval. In contrast, participants who selected M should
decrease their importance ratings for attributes favoring K between the pre- and the midchoice periods and increase their importance ratings for attributes favoring M over the
same interval.
To test these predictions, importance ratings were examined using a 2 (Treatment
chosen: K or M; between subjects) by 2 (Alternative Favored: K or M; within subjects)
by 2 (Time: pre- or mid-choice; within subjects) mixed-model MANOVA with
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importance ratings paired as favoring K or M as the 2 dependent variables. A significant
3-way choice-by-favored-by-time interaction with importance scores shifting to make the
chosen alternative more attractive would provide support for the general form of
coherence shifting under Hypothesis 2. The strong form of coherence shifting would be
supported if these changes follow the pattern described above.
Six participants were identified as multivariate outliers on serious disease
importance scores and were removed from analysis, resulting in a sample of 119.
Treatment K was chosen by 77 of these participants (64.7%) and M was chosen by 42
(35.3%). Full MANOVA results are available in Appendix D (Table D1.1). Figure 2
shows the data relevant to the coherence shifting hypothesis. M choosers appear to have
shown the strong form of coherence shifting, while K choosers appear to show no
coherence shifting, as the slopes of the time-change lines are parallel. In the omnibus
multivariate test, the 3-way interaction of choice, time and whether attributes favor K or
M was significant (Pillai’s = .066, F(2,116) = 4.11, p = .016, ηG2 =0.016), with a
negligible effect on importance. This supports the general form of the coherence shifting
hypothesis. (Other significant main effects and interactions were found, as shown in
Appendix D.)
Given the different patterns for choosers of K vs. M, separate within-subjects 2 by
2 (time by treatment favored) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted for these
groups. A significant treatment-favored by time interaction supported the strong form of
coherence shifting for M choosers (F (1, 41) = 5.40, p = 0.025, ηG2 =0.062), a small effect.
This interaction was not significant for K choosers (F (1, 76) = 2.12, p = 0.150 ηG2
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=0.014), which provides no support for coherence shifting. See Table D1.2 for full
ANOVA results. Thus, coherence shifting was supported for K choosers but not for M
choosers.
In summary, the omnibus 3-way interaction was significant but showed a
negligible effect size. Also, coherence shifting was found only for K choosers. Thus, the
evidence for coherence shifting regarding importance scores is weak.

Figure 2.. Study 1 average serious disease attribute importance ratings favoring K or M by choice and time.
M choosers (2b) altered their importance ratings between the pre- and mid-choice times showing the strong
form of coherence shifting. K choosers (2a) did not shift scores. Error bars = 2SE.

Serious Disease: Affect. The strong form of coherence shifting predicted that
affect towards outcomes of the chosen treatment would increase from before the decision
to the middle of the decision, while affect towards outcomes of the non-chosen treatment
would decrease over the same interval. Furthermore, for participants who chose K, affect
towards treatment K outcomes should increase and affect towards treatment M outcomes
should decrease between pre- and mid-choice ratings. In contrast, for those choosing M,
affect towards M outcomes should increase and affect for K outcomes should decrease in
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the same interval. To test for coherence shifting, affect ratings were examined using a 2
(Treatment chosen: K or M; between subjects) by 2 (Outcome Treatment: K or M; within
subjects) by 2 (Time: pre- or mid-choice; within subjects) mixed-model MANOVA with
outcome ratings on each attribute as the 4 dependent variables. A significant choice-bytreatment-by-time interaction in a direction that made the chosen alternative more
attractive would provide support for coherence shifting.
One participant was identified as a multivariate outlier in all affect dependent
variables, resulting in a sample of 124. Of these, 81 chose Treatment K (65.3%) and 42
chose M (34.7%). Figure 3 shows the data relevant to the coherence shifting hypothesis.
Although the data do not support the strong form of coherence shifting, they seem
consistent with the general form in which affect ratings for outcomes of the chosen
treatment increase from pre- to mid-choice more than ratings for outcomes of the nonchosen treatment. The predicted choice by outcome treatment by time interaction was
significant. (Pillai’s = .089, F(4,119) = 2.89, p = 0.023, ηG2 = 0.023), showing a small
effect on affect ratings. Thus, the outcome affect ratings supported the general form of
coherence shifting.
The MANOVA also showed that outcome affect ratings increased significantly
from before (M = -1.86, SD =1.17) to in the middle of the decision (M = -1.30, SD =
1.08), (Pillai’s = 0.819, F(4,119) = 134.81, p = <.001, ηG2 =.0.513), with a very large
effect size. Figure 3 shows that all outcomes were rated negatively, which makes sense
given that these outcomes were selected to be highly unpleasant. This main effect means
that participants optimistically rated outcomes as less unpleasant in the decision context
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than in the de-contextualized situation before the decision. This could explain why the
data supported the general but not the strong form of coherence shifting. Other significant
main effects and interactions were found, as shown in Appendix D (Tables D2.1 and
D2.2).

Figure 3.. Study 1 average serious disease outcome affect ratings by choice and time.Both types of choosers

generally increased their affect scores between the pre- and mid-choice times, but sharper increases
occurred for outcomes of the chosen treatment. All sub-figures are in the same scale. Error bars = 2SE.

Four univariate ANOVAs with the same independent variables showed that the
predicted choice by outcome treatment by time interaction was only significant for
Duration of symptoms (F(1,122) =9.20, p = 0.003, ηG2 = 0.015), a negligible effect size.
Duration followed the pattern expected with general coherence shifting, with scores
increasing over time but with steeper increases for the chosen treatment.
In summary, the general form of coherence shifting was supported for affect towards
outcomes and showed a small effect size. The strong form of the prediction in Hypothesis
2 was not supported.
Coherence Shifting: Job Task.
Job task: Importance. Similar to the serious disease task, the strong version of
coherence shifting would be supported in the Job Task if those choosing Splendor rated
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attributes favoring Splendor (Office, Commute) as more important and attributes favoring
Bonnie’s Best (Salary, Vacation) as less important between the pre- and mid-choice
times. Bonnie’s Best choosers should show the opposite importance changes. Importance
ratings were examined using a 2 by 2 by 2 (final choice by job favored by time) mixedmodel MANOVA with the importance ratings grouped by job favored as the 2 dependent
variables. Seven participants were identified as multivariate outliers on importance
scores, resulting in a sample of 118. Of these, 75 chose Splendor (65.2%) and 43 chose
Bonnie’s Best (34.8%). Figure 5 shows importance scores relevant to the coherence
shifting hypothesis. The predicted choice by time by job favored interaction was
significant, (Pillai’s = 0.222, F(2, 115) = 16.36, p < .001, ηG2 =0.064), showing a small
effect on importance ratings. As shown in Figure 4, importance ratings shifted as
predicted by the strong form of the coherence shifting hypothesis. Other significant main
effects and interactions were found. See Appendix D (Table D3) for full statistical
results.
Job task: Affect. Coherence shifting of affect ratings towards job outcomes was
examined using a 2 by 2 by 2 (final choice by job outcome by time) mixed-model
MANOVA with the outcome affect ratings paired across the 4 attributes as dependent
variables. Seven participants were identified as multivariate outliers on affect scores,
resulting in a sample of 118. Of these, 75 chose Splendor (65.2%) and 43 chose Bonnie’s
Best (34.8%). Figure 5 shows a summary of changes in affect scores by choice, outcome
job, and time. The predicted 3-way interaction was not significant, (Pillai’s = 0.073., F(4,
113) = 2.22, p = 0.072, ηG2 =0.017), with a negligible effect size. Thus, coherence shifting
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in job outcome affect scores was not supported. Other significant main effects and
interactions were found (see Appendix D, Tables D4.1 and D4.2). (In univariate
ANOVAs with the same independent variables, the 3-way interaction testing coherence
shifting was only significant for Office type (F(1. 116) = 5.53, p = 0.020, ηG2 = 0.006),
but this effect was negligible in size.)

Figure 4. Study 1 average job task attribute importance ratings favoring Splendor or BB by choice and

time.Choosers of each treatment changed scores from the pre- to mid-time in opposite directions in
accordance with the strong form of coherence shifting under Hypothesis 2. BB = Bonnie’s Best. Error bars
= 2 SE.

Figure 5. Study 1 average job task affect outcome ratings by choice and time. The choice by treatment by time

interaction for changes from pre- to mid-choice ratings was significant. BB = Bonnie’s Best. Error bars = 2
SE.
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To summarize the results for the job task, coherence shifting of importance
scores was significant and showed a small effect size. Coherence shifting was not
supported for affect ratings.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that higher coherence shifting would lead to a decrease in
aversive feelings towards the decision and in arousal after the mid-choice time.
Hypothesis 3 was not examined in Experiment 1.
Between-Task Comparisons and Exploratory Analysis.
Participants who were identified as multivariate outliers on any previous analysis
were removed from the following analyses, resulting in a sample size of N = 106.
Between-Task Aversive Feelings: Hypothesis 4 suggested that aversive feelings
towards a decision would be higher in a serious disease treatment task than the job
selection task, which threatened lower-level goals. To assess differences in aversive
feelings related to the decision task as a whole, participant scores on the 4 items on the
aversive feelings scale were compared using 4 paired-samples t-tests. Descriptive
statistics and statistical tests are presented in Appendix D (Table D5). Participants
reported significantly higher aversive feelings during the serious disease task than during
the job task for all scales. Aversive feelings were rated 1.32 points higher on an 8-point
scale, on average. Reliability for the aversive feelings scale was high in both the serious
disease (α = 0.872) and job (α = 0.875) tasks.
Between-Task Coherence Shifting. One important contribution of this research
program is a comparison of coherence shifting between tasks that involve different
decision contexts and outcomes on substantially different attributes. Past research has
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identified differences in decision strategy based on attributes threatening higher- vs.
lower-level goals, but not differences in the degree of coherence shifting (Luce, 1998;
Payne & Bettman, 2004). In Experiment 1, job task attributes threatened relatively lowerlevel goals such as comfort (e.g., office size, commute), whereas the serious disease task
threatened higher level goals such as health and survival. (Serious disease outcomes were
also manipulated to be highly unpleasant, creating a likely confound with differences in
emotional salience. Differences in emotional salience will be examined independently in
Experiment 2.) Given the lack of empirical evidence to form a hypothesis, I have
presented between-task comparisons in an exploratory manner.
To compare the levels of coherence shifting individuals engaged in between tasks,
attribute importance and outcome affect ratings were combined into aggregate variables
using a technique used by Simon et al. (2004) and Carpenter et al. (2016). Importance
and affect ratings at each time were scaled and then combined into measures where +1
would indicate complete favorability towards one alternative (Treatment K or Splendor
job) and -1 would indicate complete favorability towards the other (M or Bonnie’s Best).
This is mathematically defined in Appendix G. Aggregated scores at the pre-choice time
are subtracted from the mid-choice time, indicating the degree of change in favorability
towards attributes or outcomes is consistent with coherence shifting. Absolute values (A)
of these scores represent overall strength of coherence shifting (CS) for affect (ACSAff)
and importance (ACSImp).
Paired-samples t-tests were used to compare absolute pre- to mid-choice
coherence shifting between the job and serious disease tasks (See Appendix D, Table
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D5). Overall shifting of importance scores was not significantly different between the
disease task (M = 0.052, SD = 0.048) and the job task (M= 0.066, SD = 0.069), t (105) = 1.91, p = 0.058. In contrast, overall shifting in affect scores was significantly higher in
the disease task (M = 0.110, SD =0.092) than in the job task (M=0.076, SD=0.056). t
(105) = 3.20, p = 0.002.
Emotional Regulation and Confidence. Following Carpenter et al. (2016),
correlations were calculated in both tasks between absolute scores of coherence shifting
and self-report measures of emotional regulation strategies. Descriptive statistics and
statistical tests are reported in Appendix D (Table D5). Correlations are reported in
Appendix D (Table D6). Pre- to mid-choice shifting of affect scores (ACSAff) in the
serious disease task were weakly but significantly correlated with Cognitive Reappraisal,
r (106) = 0.227. p = 0.019, r2 = 0.051, i.e., stronger coherence shifting was associated
with a higher tendency to change one’s thinking in response to an emotional stimulus. No
other significant correlations between coherence shifting and emotion regulation
strategies were found. This pattern differs from findings by Carpenter et al. (2016) using
the same job task as in the current study. They found that coherence shifting of combined
desirability (similar to affect) and importance scores correlated positively with the
expression suppression scale of emotional regulation, but not with cognitive reappraisal.
Another exploratory analysis focused on the idea that coherence shifting may
serve to increase participants’ confidence that they have made the correct decision, which
should reduce their negative emotions related to the decision. Ratings of confidence in
the final decisions in the serious disease and job tasks were examined for correlations
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with overall coherence shifting. See Appendix D (Table D6) for full correlations.
Stronger shifting of affect scores in the serious disease task was correlated with greater
decision confidence, r (106) = 0.304, p = 0.002, r2 = 0.092. Stronger shifting of job
importance scores correlated with greater confidence in the final job chosen, r (106) =
0.208, p = 0.033, r2 = 0.043. Coherence shifting was not significantly correlated with any
changes in confidence across the course of the decision, as calculated by subtracting
confidence in the mid-choice leaning from final choice confidence ratings.
Prior Experience and Outside Influences. In order to determine if any factors
outside of the decision context affected treatment choice (such as those reported in Wong
et al, 2013), participants completed single-item measures of health insurance coverage
(yes or no), experience with malaria in themselves or someone close to them (yes or no),
and the extent to which they avoid medical procedures due to a fear of injections or
needles. Only 3 participants (2.8%) indicated previous experience with malaria and only
4 participants (3.8%) reported that they did not have health insurance. Given the small
number of participants in these categories, Fisher’s exact tests were used for these
comparisons. An independent-samples t-test was used to examine fear of needles and
treatment choice. Those with malaria experience chose treatment K about as often (1 out
of 3, 66.7%) as those without experience (67 of 103, 65.0%), Fisher’s Exact p = 0.722.
Those with health insurance chose treatment K about as often (66 of 102, 64.7%) as those
without insurance (3 out of 4, 75% chose K), Fisher’s Exact p = 0.564. Fear of needles
was not significantly different between those who chose K (n = 69, M = 7.49, SD = 2.45)
and those who chose M (n=37, M = 6.78, SD = 1.72)¸ t (96.74) = 1.87, p = 0.086.

56

Experiment 1 Summary
The hypothesis regarding the predictive analyses (#1) was partially supported in
both tasks. A model including pre-choice outcome affect and mid-choice feelings (2.1)
was either similarly predictive (serious disease task) or less predictive (job task) of choice
than a model only including mid-choice feelings towards alternatives (Model 2.0). Thus,
including pre-choice affect ratings did not substantially improve prediction of choice.
These results support the theory that choice is constructed from the affective evaluation
of alternatives as a whole, since adding in pre-existing preferences towards individual
outcomes either did not improve prediction much or made it worse. However, they do not
support the hypothesis that pre-choice affect towards outcomes would improve the ability
to predict choice. The expectation that the above affect-based models would predict
choice better than attribute-based models like weighted additive and lexicographic was
supported.
The coherence-shifting hypothesis (#2), which predicted that affect and
importance ratings would shift prior to a final decision to be more favorable toward the
alternative chosen, was supported for some importance ratings in both tasks, and (in a
more general form) for affect ratings only in the disease task. These findings support the
theory of coherence shifting in a health context, where emotional reactions are adjusted
before choice as part of the decision-making process. However, the size of the coherence
shifting effects was low; ranging from negligible (ηG2 = 0.016) to small (ηG2 = 0.064).
Although shifting of affect scores in the job task did not replicate similar findings by
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Simon et al. (2004) in outcome desirability ratings, shifting in importance scores was
replicated.
Participants reported stronger task-related aversive feelings during the serious
disease task, supporting Hypothesis 4. Participants showed stronger aversive feelings in a
task with highly unpleasant outcomes that threaten higher-level goals than in a task with
relatively emotionally neutral outcomes threatening lower-level goals. Participants also
shifted affect scores more strongly between the pre- and mid-choice times in the serious
disease task, but did not show differences in importance score shifting. A significant
positive correlation was found between an emotion regulation strategy (cognitive
reappraisal) and coherence shifting, but only in the serious disease task and only for
affect scores. Taken together, these findings suggest that participants changed their affect
towards outcomes to reduce overall aversive feelings towards a decision, but only when
the task produced sufficiently negative emotions. Participants showed coherence shifting
for importance scores in both tasks, but these shifts were not correlated with broad
emotion regulation strategies. Experiment 2 examined the use of coherence shifting as
emotion regulation more directly, using an objective physiological affect measure.
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EXPERIMENT 2: PHYSIOLOGICAL AROUSAL AND MULTIPLE DISEASE
TREATMENT DECISIONS
Experiment 2 expanded upon Experiment 1 in two ways. First, rather than using
an emotionally neutral job selection task, participants in this experiment completed
treatment decision tasks for a relatively mild disease with moderately negative physical
outcomes and a serious disease with severe physical outcomes. Unlike the two dissimilar
tasks in Experiment 1, these two tasks used the same attributes and used outcomes
selected from the pilot to provide similar levels of conflict between alternatives. This was
intended to reduce between-task differences in attribute-based threats to important goals
(Luce, 1998). In addition, selecting outcomes that were an equal distance apart on pilot
affect ratings (ratings of 2 & 4 vs. ratings of 4 & 6) provided a level of control over
decision conflict as defined by Carpenter and Niedenthal (2017).
Second, in addition to self-report measures, this study used an objective measure
of physiological arousal as an index of aversive emotions. If coherence shifting serves an
emotional regulation role, physiological arousal should decrease for people who have
shifted their preferences, as found by Carpenter et al. (2016).
Skin Conductance for Physiological Arousal
In addition to all measures used in Experiment 1, skin conductance was used as an
objective measure of physiological arousal. Skin conductance is a measure of the
electrical conductivity of the skin based on eccrine sweating, which is directly related to
the autonomic nervous system. Skin conductance has seen extensive use as a measure of
affective response in decision-making research (Figner & Murphy, 2011) and of general
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stress or arousal in experimental settings (Boucsein, 2012). With roughly a 1 to 5 s delay
before response to a specific stimulus, skin conductance is a slow or time-lagged measure
compared to physiological measures such as event-related potentials. It is also sensitive
to artifacts related to movement, respiration, and speaking. Even if it were a perfectly
reliable measure of autonomic nervous system activity or physiological arousal,
physiological arousal is simply an activation of the sympathetic nervous system, and
relies further on cognitive evaluation of the context of the situation to be interpreted as a
positive or negative emotional state (Loewenstein et al. 2001). Arousal is affected by
many other physiological and mental processes, making it difficult to claim that any
particular skin conductance response is definitely related to affect. Within affect, skin
conductance only reliably aligns with the arousal dimension. Additional subjective
measures, such as those included in this experiment, are usually required to assess
positivity, dominance, or other dimensions (Figner & Murphy). In spite of these
limitations, skin conductance response is sufficiently sensitive to detect immediate
affective responses to anticipated rewards and punishments in decision making, and even
to detect anticipatory affect that predicts decision-making in repeated-decision tasks such
as the Iowa Gambling Task in line with the somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara, Tranel,
& Damasio, 2000; Bechara et al., 1996).
One important issue in selecting a measure of skin conductance is the difference
between phasic and tonic skin conductance measures, and their use for short-term or
persistent affective responses. Tonic changes in skin conductance level (SCL) are gradual
increases or decreases in skin conductance. Phasic changes or skin conductance
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responses (SCR) are rapid, short-term elevations in conductance followed by a delayed
decline. To examine the role of coherence shifting in regulating negative affect,
Carpenter et al. (2016) measured SCRs occurring between 1 and 3 s after each screen
where participants completed importance and desirability ratings. They defined these
SCRs as negative emotion caused by decision conflict and proposed that lower SCRs in
the post-decision period represented a regulation of emotion. However, they selected this
measure and time period due to its use in past decision making research, where it was
used to index short-term affective responses to the outcomes of decision-making
(Bechara et al, 2000; Bechara et al., 1996). These are known as specific responses, or
SCRs that are related to a specific stimulus. Carpenter et al. (2016) intended to measure
medium-term (e.g., minutes) changes in aversive feelings towards a decision as a whole,
but used a measurement window traditionally used to identify rapid (e.g., seconds)
affective reactions to a specific stimulus (e.g., reading one decision outcome). It is not
possible to distinguish between these sources of affect using SCR, a potential confound.
Carpenter et al. (2106) proposed that aversive feelings arise from the difficulty of
a decision itself, with coherence shifting serving to reduce these feelings. If these feelings
are persistent until a regulatory process occurs, their role should be more similar to an
ongoing stressor than to a rapid affective reaction. Measures of SCL, or tonic skin
conductance level, are more commonly used and reliable for measuring the impact of
laboratory stressors (Boucsein, 2012). These includes threats of physical pain or watching
disturbing video clips, but some are even accurate for detecting weaker, instruction-based
threats (Boucsein; Kilpatrick, 1972). These measures use various methods of eliminating
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specific responses, such as measuring only in windows devoid of responses or
statistically removing spikes characteristic of a response. It is still not possible to
distinguish between sources of negative affect or the nature of the decision-making
process through this measure, but an SCL measure should be able to distinguish between
changes in persistent aversive feelings on the one hand and simple, short-term affective
responses to decision information on the other. Equipment used to record skin
conductance necessarily records both SCR and SCL, so both were analyzed.
Method
Participants. An additional power analysis was conducted for the effect of time
and psychological threat on skin conductance using a similar interaction taken from
Kilpatrick (1972), r = .331. Using a multilevel model power analysis method provided by
Bickel (2007) with an alpha = .05, power = 0.80, the projected sample size needed to
reproduce this interaction effect size was N = 46. Thus, power analyses from Experiment
1 still provide the conservative estimate.
Participants included 95 Clemson University psychology students (Age:
M=19.87, SD=2.61, 70.2% female). Participants were treated according to APA ethical
guidelines under the supervision of Clemson University’s Institutional Review Board.
Recruitment in Study 2 was lower than in Study 1 because measuring skin conductance
required testing participants individually and there were two sessions (two weeks apart)
compared to Study 1’s single session. This resulted in a lower power of analyses in Study
2. Participants were compensated at a rate of $10 for an initial session and $20 for a
second session. This incentive was used to reduce participant dropout between sessions.
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Design. The overall experiment followed a 2 (decision task: mild vs. serious
disease treatment) by 3 (measurement time: pre-, mid-, post-choice) within-subjects
design. Analysis focused only on the pre- and mid-choice times. Final choice between
alternatives for each decision task (Mild disease treatment: Treatment T or N; Serious
disease treatment: Treatment K or M) was dichotomous and was used as a betweensubjects predictor variable or a criterion depending upon the analysis. An aggregate
measure of preference shifting based on outcome affect and attribute importance ratings
was used to predict changes in physiological arousal. Analyses for each decision task
were conducted separately.
All dependent variables measured in Experiment 1 were included in Experiment
2. In addition, SCR and SCL were measured at a baseline and at pre-choice, mid-choice,
and post-choice rating times.
Measures. All dependent variables and demographics measures used in
Experiment 1 were also collected in Experiment 2. Skin conductance was recorded using
a Biopac GSR100 skin conductance module, MP150 base module, and STP100C digital
interface. AcqKnowledge software was used to record skin conductance data. Based on
recommendations by Figner and Murphy (2011), disposable electrodes were placed on
the distal (first) phalanges of the index and middle finger of the participant’s nondominant hand. Skin conductance sampling acquisition was set to 500 Hz (samples/sec).
Hardware was set to record using DC, with amplification set to 5 μSiemens/V and a lowpass filter set to 1 Hz. Experimenters measured ambient temperature within the
laboratory at the beginning and end of every session. Coded markers were automatically
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placed in AcqKnowledge software through MediaLab software and were verified in real
time by experimenters. Experimenters also recorded the time and nature of any
disturbances that may have led to recording artifacts.
Procedure. Participants attended 2 sessions, a minimum of 2 weeks apart.
Experimental sessions were conducted with one participant and one experimenter. Each
session included either the serious disease treatment decision (identical to Experiment 1,
see Table 3) or the mild disease treatment decision shown in Table 2. Participants were
randomly assigned to complete the mild or serious disease task first. The materials and
measures for the mild disease treatment decision were the same as those for the serious
disease decision, except that the instructions asked participants to imagine that they had
been diagnosed with a strain of influenza and that the outcomes listed were those in Table
2 rather than those in Table 3. Attributes were the same between tasks.
Stimuli were presented in MediaLab (v2012) software. The general timing of
materials and measures were the same as in Experiment 1, except that the experimenter
controlled when the participants proceeded between rating times. Skin conductance was
only recorded during the baseline measure and at the pre-, mid-, and post-choice rating
times. For each session, after providing consent, participants first had electrodes placed
on their non-dominant hand. After at least five minutes, a baseline measure of skin
conductance was recorded. This included an active baseline (participants taking a deep
breath) followed by a two-minute passive baseline (during which they were instructed not
to move or talk.). The process was repeated with fresh electrodes for null responses.
Participants were asked to avoid body movement, any motion in their non-dominant
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hand, or speech during tasks as to avoid recording artifacts. Each measurement period
took no longer than 5 minutes and participants were informed when measurement was
occurring and when they were free to move or talk.
After these instructions, the experimenter began recording skin conductance and
the participants were shown the pre-choice instructions and ratings as in Experiment 1.
Markers were automatically placed at each screen including experimental stimuli and at
each rating. Skin conductance was recorded during both outcome and attribute ratings
(and, for later tasks, choice). After this, participants completed either a spatial reasoning
task (Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976) or items from a personal interests survey
(Goldberg, 2010) as a distractor task. Distractors used different items between tasks and
were presented in a cross-balanced order with instructions that they were not intelligence
tests to avoid external stress.
After the first distractor, the participant was shown mid-choice materials
including the instruction that the treatment decision must be delayed for laboratory
bloodwork. This delay instruction was present in both disease tasks. The experimenter
resumed recording and the participants completed mid-choice ratings. Participants then
completed the second distractor. The experimenter then resumed recording and the
participant made a final decision and provided post-choice ratings as in Experiment 1.
Participants then completed demographic and external influence measures, which
were recorded in the first session. The experimenter then removed the disposable
electrodes. The participant was then compensated with $10 in cash and asked to schedule
a second session at least two weeks later. This was partially to allow time for preferences
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to return to a pre-decision baseline. Simon et al. (2008) found that preferences revert very
quickly over time, but only using relatively emotionally neutral tasks. More importantly,
this time lapse was meant to reduce order effects and prevent affect from the prior
decision from influencing arousal in the later decision.
In the second session, each participant returned and completed the second task.
This followed the same pattern and timeline as the first session, only with the other
disease treatment decision task and with alternate distractor task content. Participants
were compensated with $20, fully debriefed, and dismissed after the second session.
Results
Predicting Choice: Mild Disease Task. A separate predictive analysis was
conducted for each task. One participant was identified as a multivariate outlier on all
predictor and outcome variables and eliminated from predictive analysis for the mild
disease task. An additional 4 participants were excluded due to computer errors resulting
in incomplete data. This resulted in a sample size for the mild disease task of N = 90.
Treatment T was chosen by 24 participants (26.7%), and Treatment N was chosen by 66
participants (73.3%). Model multiple regression omnibus statistical tests, effect size, and
fit information for the mild disease task are available in Table 7. All models significantly
predicted choice, p < .05.
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Table 7: Model statistical tests and fit for the Study 2 Mild Disease task
Log

McFadden’s

McFadden's

Model

Likelihood

χ2 (df)

P

Pseudo-R2

R2 adjusted

AIC

0 Null

-52.19

-

-

0.000

0.000

106.39

1.0 Affect (Charpentier)

-43.02

18.36* (8)

0.019

0.176

0.022

104.03

2.0 Affect (Mid-choice)

-27.19

50.00** (6)

< .001

0.479

0.364

68.39

2.1 Affect (Schlösser)

-19.23

65.94** (14)

< .001

0.632

0.363

68.45

3.0 Attribute-based

-46.01

12.38* (4)

0.015

0.118

0.042

102.01

3.1 Lexicographic

-48.54

7.30* (2)

0.026

0.070

0.032

103.09

4.0 W.Add (Main effects)

-38.7

29.98* (12)

0.008

0.258

0.029

103.4

4.1 W.Add (Interaction)

-35.6

33.19* (20)

0.032

0.318

-0.065

113.2

N = 90. * p < .05, ** p < .001. AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. W.Add = Weighted Additive.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that Model 2.1, which contained affect towards outcomes
outside of the decision context (pre-choice) and feelings towards alternatives during
decision making (mid-choice), would best predict choice. Model 2.0, which included
only mid-choice feelings for alternatives, showed the best fit (AIC = 68.39). Model 2.1
(AIC = 68.45) also strongly predicted choice (as it was within 2 AIC of Model 2.1). No
other models provide substantial fit.
Regression coefficients and odds ratios for predictors in the mild disease task are
presented in Appendix E (Tables E1.1 through E1.3). In both models 2.0 and 2.1,
Positivity towards both alternatives significantly predicted choice. In Model 2.0,
Dominance towards N also significantly predicted choice. Positivity most strongly
predicted choice. In Model 2.0, participants became 2.35 times more likely to choose
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Treatment T for every 1 point increase in positivity towards T. Participants became 2.85
(1/0.35) times more likely to choose Treatment N for every 1 point increase in positivity
towards N.
The similar fits of Model 2.1 and 2.0 and the fact that none of the specific prechoice affect scores in Model 2.1 significantly predicted treatment choice suggests that
affect towards alternatives during decision making is the strongest predictor of choice and
affect towards outcomes outside of the decision context was not predictive. This only
partially supported Hypothesis 1.
Predicting Choice: Serious Disease Task (Experiment 2). Five participants
were eliminated from predictive analysis for the serious disease task (Experiment 2) as
multivariate outliers and an additional 2 participants were excluded due to experimental
errors, resulting in a sample size of N = 88. Treatment K was chosen by 41 participants
(46.5%) and Treatment M was chosen by 47 participants (53.4%). Model omnibus
statistical tests, effect sizes, and fit information for the serious disease task are available
in Table 8.
Findings were similar to the mild disease task. Only Models 2.0 and 2.1
significantly predicted choice. Model 2.0 (only mid-choice feelings towards alternatives)
was the best-fitting model (AIC = 64.9). No other models provided substantial fit,
including the hypothesized best-fitting model, 2.1. This only partially supported
Hypothesis 1. In Model 2.0, positivity towards both alternatives significantly predicted
job choice and most strongly predicted choice. In Model 2.0, participants became 1.97
times more likely to choose Treatment K for every 1 point increase in positivity towards
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K. Participants became 2.63 (1/0.38) times more likely to choose Treatment M for every
1 point increase in positivity towards M (see Appendix E, Tables E2.1 and E2.2).
The findings from these predictive analyses were similar to those from Study 1,
which also found that Model 2.0 was always the most predictive of choice or equally as
predictive as Model 2.1 and that ratings of positivity towards alternatives were the
strongest individual predictors of choice. Across both studies, Hypothesis 1 was partially
supported—as affect towards alternatives during decision making predicted choice—and
partially disconfirmed—as affect towards outcomes outside of the decision context did
not predict choice.

Table 8: Model statistical tests and fit for the Study 2 Serious Disease task
Log

McFadden’s

McFadden's

Model

Likelihood

χ2 (df)

P

Pseudo-R2

R2 adjusted

AIC

0 Null

-60.79

-

-

0.000

0.000

123.58

1.0 Affect (Charpentier)

-57.72

6.15 (8)

0.631

0.051

-0.081

133.44

2.0 Affect (Mid-choice)

-25.46

70.66** (6)

< .001

0.581

0.482

64.92

2.1 Affect (Schlösser)

-20.15

81.29** (14)

< .001

0.669

0.471

70.30

3.0 Attribute-based

-57.77

6.04 (4)

0.196

0.050

-0.016

125.55

3.1 Lexicographic

-58.79

4.00 (2)

0.135

0.033

0.000

123.59

4.0 W.Add (Main effects)

-54.72

12.15 (12)

0.434

0.100

-0.098

140.36

4.1 W.Add (Interaction)

-48.57

24.44 (20)

0.224

0.201

0.037

139.15

N = 88. * p < .05, ** p < .001. AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. W.Add = Weighted Additive.
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Coherence Shifting: Mild Disease Task.
Mild Disease: Importance. The coherence shifting hypothesis (#2) stated that when
treatment T was chosen, importance ratings for attributes favoring T would increase from
pre- to mid-choice and attributes favoring N would decrease; with the opposite pattern
expected when N was chosen. Four participants were excluded due to experimental
errors, resulting in a sample of 91. Of these, 25 chose Treatment T (26.4%) and 67 chose
Treatment N (73.6%). Figure 6 shows importance scores averaged across favored
treatment by choice and time. Participants who chose N seemed to show the strong form
of coherence shifting, with importance ratings increasing or decreasing over time
depending on whether attributes favored their choice or not, respectively. In contrast, T
choosers seemed to show little coherence shifting (parallel lines for change over time). In
a 2 (choice) by 2 (treatment favored) by 2 (time) MANOVA, the predicted choice by
treatment-favored by time interaction for importance ratings was significant, (Pillai’s =
.075, F(2, 88) = 3.55, p = 0.033, ηG2 =0.018), but showed a negligible effect size. Other
significant main effects and interactions were found, see Appendix F (See Tables F1.1
and F1.2).
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Figure 6. Study 2 average mild disease attribute importance ratings favoring T or N by choice and time. N
choosers shifted importance scores between the pre- and mid-choice times in accordance with strong-form
coherence shifting, whereas T choosers generally decreased all importance ratings but showed high
individual variability. N = 91. Error bars = 2SE.

Separate within-subjects 2 by 2 (time by treatment favored) repeated-measures
ANOVAs were conducted for T and N choosers. A significant treatment-favored by time
interaction supported the strong form of coherence shifting for N choosers (F (1, 66) =
20.37, p < .001, ηG2 =0.105), a small effect. This interaction was not significant for T
choosers (F (1, 23) < 1, p = .946 ηG2 =0.000), which provides no support for coherence
shifting. See Appendix F (Table F1.2) for full ANOVA results. Thus, for the mild disease
task, coherence shifting of importance ratings was supported for N choosers but not for T
choosers.
Mild disease task: Affect. Four participants were excluded due to experimental
errors and 1 was identified as a multivariate outlier on affect scores, resulting in a sample
of 90. Of these, 24 chose Treatment T (26.7%) and 67 chose Treatment N (73.3%).
Figure 7 shows outcome ratings changing in the direction predicted by the strong version
of coherence shifting for both T and N choosers. In a 2 (choice) by 2 (outcome treatment)
by 2 (time) MANOVA, the predicted choice by time interaction in overall outcome affect
ratings was significant, (Pillai’s = 0.226, F(2, 88) = 6.29, p = <.001, ηG2 =0.060),
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representing a small effect. Appendix F (Tables F2.1 & F2.2) includes complete
statistical analysis. Other significant main effects and interactions were found.

Figure 7. Study 2 average mild disease affect outcome ratings by choice and time. The choice by time
interaction for changes from pre- to mid-choice ratings is visible. N = 90. Error bars = 2SE.

To summarize, for the mild disease task, coherence shifting of importance scores
was supported for participants who made one choice, but not for those who made the
other choice. Coherence shifting of affect scores was supported, with an effect size of ηG2
=0.08.
Coherence Shifting: Serious Disease Task (Experiment 2)
Serious Disease: Importance. Three participants were excluded as multivariate
outliers and another 2 were excluded due to experimental error, resulting in a sample of
90. Of these, 41 chose Treatment K (45.6%) and 49 chose Treatment M (54.4%). Figure
8 shows changes in importance scores consistent with the general form of coherence
shifting for K choosers and the strong form for M choosers. From the choice by treatment
favored by time MANOVA, the 3-way interaction for importance predicted by the
coherence shifting hypothesis scores was significant, (Pillai’s = 0.098, F(2, 87) = 4.72, p
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= .011, ηG2 =0.025), and showed a small effect size. Other significant main effects and
interactions were found, see Appendix F (Tables F2.1 and F2.2).

Figure 8. Study 2 average serious disease attribute importance ratings favoring K or M by choice and time.
The predicted choice by time interaction was significant. N = 90. Error bars = 2SE.
.

Serious disease task: Affect. Two participants were excluded as multivariate outliers
on affect scores and 2 were excluded due to experimental errors, resulting in a sample of
91. Of these, 43 chose Treatment K (47.3%) and 48 chose Treatment M (52.7%). The
direction of changes shown in Figure 9 do not match the predictions of strong coherence
shifting but do match the pattern of general coherence shifting seen in the serious disease
task in Experiment 1. In the 2 by 2 by 2 choice by time by outcome-treatment
MANOVA, the predicted choice by time interaction in overall outcome affect ratings was
significant, (Pillai’s = 0.368., F(4, 86) = 12.52, p < .001, ηG2 = 0.117), and had a small
effect size. However, this effect size was more than five times as large as the same
interaction for this task in Experiment 1. The general form of coherence shifting (but not
the strong form predicted in Hypothesis 2) was supported for coherence shifting in
serious disease treatment outcome affect scores. Other significant main effects and
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interactions were found, Appendix F (Tables F4.1 and F4.2) for full statistical results.

Figure 9.: Study 2 average serious disease outcome affect ratings by choice and time. Similar to the same task in

Experiment 1, participants generally increased affect ratings between the pre- and mid-choice times, but
showed steeper increases for their chosen treatment. N = 90. Error bars = 2SE.

Experiment 2 Coherence Shifting Summary
Findings in coherence shifting were similar between Experiments 1 and 2. Overall
coherence shifting was supported for importance scores in all four tasks. Affect
coherence shifting was not supported for the Experiment 1 job task, but was supported in
all treatment decision tasks across the two experiments. More support was found for the
general form of coherence shifting than for the strong form predicted in Hypothesis 2.
The general form appeared in affect ratings for the serious disease task in both
experiments and in Experiment 2 serious disease importance ratings. Effect sizes for the
coherence shifting interaction were much larger in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1,
especially for the serious disease task used in both experiments. This is likely an effect of
the inclusion of a distractor task between the pre- and mid-choice ratings, which was
omitted in the first Experiment.
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Experiment 2 Coherence Shifting, Aversive Feelings and Physiological
Arousal.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that higher coherence shifting would lead to a decrease in
aversive feelings and physiological arousal after the mid-choice time, as shifting has been
proposed as a mechanism for reducing decision-related negative affect (Carpenter et al.
2016; Carpenter & Niedenthal, 2017).
Physiological data were analyzed for a small pilot sample from Experiment 2
participants (n = 39). (Full analyses will be presented in an upcoming publication.) SCR
and SCL values were calculated for the full period during which participants rated
outcome affect, with responses to known artifacts (e.g., participant movement)
subtracted. Tonic skin conductance (SCR) was calculated as the average amplitude of
responses across this period in µS. Phasic skin conductance (SCL) was calculated as the
minimum amplitude of skin conductance during this period. SCR or SCL scores from the
resting baseline were subtracted from the respective measure. Participants who failed to
display any skin conductance responses during at least one full recording period were
eliminated from analysis for possible recording errors, resulting in sample sizes of n = 16
(Mild disease task) and n =14 (Serious disease task).
For each task, two multiple linear regression models were conducted with a
composite measure of coherence shifting (zACSoverall, see Appendix G), linear and
quadratic terms for recording time (pre-, mid-, and post-choice), and interactions between
coherence shifting, linear time, and quadratic time as predictors and skin conductance
(SCL or SCR) at the three recording times as the criterion. Phasic skin conductance
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(SCL) is the preferred measure for long-term changes in arousal, such as overall arousal
due to the decision as a whole (Boucsein, 2012). Hypothesis 3 would be supported if a
coherence shifting x time (quadratic) interaction was significant and showed a sharper
decrease in SCL between the mid- and post-choice rating times for people who showed
stronger coherence shifting.
Neither time nor coherence shifting significantly predicted SCR in either task (p’s
> .05), so no further data is presented. Figure 10 shows simple quadratic slopes of SCL
for high, average, and low coherence shifting over time. Regression coefficients
predicting SCL are shown in Appendix F (Table F5). Coherence shifting and the critical
coherence shifting x time (quadratic) interaction were not significant predictors of SCL.
Thus, coherence shifting did not lead to slope differences in SCL over time. Hypothesis 3
was not supported in this pilot sample. Strength of coherence shifting did not predict
changes in arousal, but participants did show similar patterns of change in arousal across
decision times. SCL was significantly predicted by both linear and quadratic terms for
time in both the mild and serious disease tasks. In both tasks, SCL generally increased
between pre- and mid-choice times and then decreased between mid- and post-choice
times.
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Figure 10. Study 2 simple quadratic slopes of SCL over time by level of coherence shifting. SCL changed
significantly over time, but coherence shifting did not significantly predict slope differences. Hi =
maximum non-outlier participant coherence shifting score (< 2SE). Med = average coherence shifting. Lo =
minimum non-outlier participant coherence shifting. Mild disease N = 16, Serious disease N = 14).

Experiment 2 Between-Task Comparisons and Exploratory Analysis.
Participants who had been identified as multivariate outliers on any previous
analysis were removed from the following analyses, resulting in a sample size of N = 84.
Group descriptive statistics and statistical tests are presented in Appendix F (Table F6),
while correlational results and overall descriptive statistics are available in Table F7.
Between-Task Aversive Feelings: Hypothesis 4 predicted that aversive feelings
would be higher in tasks that have less pleasant physical outcomes. Both the mild and
serious disease tasks threaten goals important to health and survival (e.g., efficacy of a
treatment, intrusive side effects and administration methods), but serious disease
outcomes were selected to produce higher negative affect than mild disease outcomes.
Accordingly, aversive feelings towards a decision should be higher in a serious disease
treatment than in the mild disease task. To assess differences in aversive feelings caused
by decision tasks, participants’ scores on the 4 items on the aversive feelings scale
(feeling anxious, stressed, unpleasant, and conflicted) were compared using 4 paired-
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samples t-tests. Participants reported significantly higher aversive feelings during the
serious disease task than during the mild task for all scales, rating aversive feelings 1.17
points higher on an 8-point scale on average. Reliability for the aversive feelings scale
was high in both the mild disease (α = 0.863) and serious disease (α = 0.916) tasks.
Between-Task Coherence Shifting. To compare the degree of coherence shifting
individuals engaged in between tasks, attribute importance and outcome affect were
combined into aggregate variables using the technique described in Experiment 1.
Absolute values of these scores represent overall strength of coherence shifting for affect
(ACSAff) and importance (ACSImp). Paired-samples t-tests were used to compare absolute
pre- to mid-choice coherence shifting between the mild and serious disease tasks. See
Appendix F for full statistics (Table F6). Overall shifting of importance scores was not
significantly different between the mild disease task (M = 0.084, SD = 0.075) and the
serious disease task (M = 0.083, SD = 0.069), t (83) = -0.08, p = 0.934. Overall shifting in
affect scores was also not significantly different between the mild disease task (M =
0.101, SD = 0.076) than in the serious disease task (M = 0.113, SD = 0.082). t (83) =
0.94, p =0.359.
Emotional Regulation and Confidence. To further investigate Carpenter et al.’s
(2016) findings concerning coherence shifting and emotional regulation, correlations
were calculated between absolute coherence-shifting scores for both tasks and self-report
measures of emotional regulation strategies from the BEQ and ERQ. Descriptive
statistics and correlations are reported in Appendix F (Table F7). Pre- to mid-choice
shifting of affect scores in the mild disease task had small positive correlations with
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Negative Emotionality (BEQ; r(82) = 0.293, p = 0.007, r2=0.085), Impulse Strength
(BEQ; r(82) = 0.273, p = 0.012, r2=0.074), Overall Emotional Expressivity (BEQ; r(82)
= 0.288, p = 0.008, r2=0.083), but was not significantly correlated with BEQ Positive
Emotionality, ERQ expressive suppression, or ERQ cognitive reappraisal (p’s > 0.05).
Together, these findings indicate that people who are more likely to express their
negative feelings strongly in their daily lives engaged in more coherence shifting
regarding affect in the mild disease task. These results are in direct contradiction with
results reported by Carpenter et al., who found that coherence shifting was significantly
negatively correlated with the exact same subscales of the BEQ in a relatively
emotionally neutral job selection task, in the opposite direction of correlation. No
significant correlations were found between strategy measures and mild disease
importance shifting or either type of serious disease score shifting.
Coherence shifting was also not found to correlate with final decision confidence
or changes in confidence within each task.
Prior Experience and Outside Influences. In order to determine if any outside
factors affected treatment choice, choice in both treatments was compared based on
health insurance status, needle fear, and malaria experience (serious disease only). Two
additional measures of experience with influenza were added for the mild disease task.
One question asked if they or anyone close to them had ever been diagnosed with
influenza or “flu” (yes or no), and the second question asked if they had personally been
diagnosed with influenza within the past 6 months (yes or no). Only 1 participant
indicated previous experience with malaria, so the effect of that experience on choice was
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not compared. General flu experience was high (54 of 84, 64%), but only 3 participants
reported that they had been personally diagnosed with influenza recently and only 5
participants reported that they did not have health insurance. Fisher’s exact tests were
used for these dichotomous comparisons. Participants with general influenza experience
chose treatment T significantly less often (10 out of 54, 18.5% chose T over N) than
those who did not report any lifetime experience with influenza (12 out of 30, 40.0%
chose T), Fisher’s Exact p = 0.031. It is possible that those without experience were less
threatened by Treatment T’s longer duration of flu symptoms, but without further
unplanned statistical tests it is unclear which aspects of Treatment T might have been
more attractive to those without flu experience (See Table 2 for outcomes). Those with a
recent personal influenza diagnosis chose treatment T about as often (1 out of 3 chose T,
33.3%) as those without experience (21 out of 81 chose T, 29.5%), Fisher’s Exact p =
0.603.
In the mild disease task, those with health insurance chose treatment T about as
often (N = 21, 26.9% chose T) as those without insurance (N=1, 16.7% chose T), Fisher’s
Exact p = 0.501. For all participants, needle fear was not significantly different between
those who chose Treatment T (n=22, M=3.55, SD=2.69) as those who chose N
(n=62,M=2.81, SD=1.89), t (28.71) =1.19, p = 0.244. Similarly, in the serious disease
task, those with health insurance chose Treatment K about as often (n=36, 46.2% chose
K) as those without health insurance (n=2, 33,3% chose K). Needle fear was not
significantly different between those who chose K (n=38, M=2.97, SD=1.87) and those
who chose N (n = 46, M = 3.50, SD = 2.23), t (82) = -1.16, p=0.250.
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Experiment 2 Discussion and Comparison with Experiment 1
Experiment 2 replicated the predictive results of Experiment 1, showing that a
model with only mid-choice feelings towards alternatives was either the most predictive
or equally predictive to a less parsimonious model also including pre-choice outcome
affect ratings.
Coherence shifting received stronger support in Experiment 2, with some form of
significant coherence shifting appearing in importance and affect ratings for both tasks.
Experiment 2 serious disease affect scores replicated the general-form pattern of
coherence shifting seen in the same task in Experiment 1. Effect sizes for coherence
shifting were much larger in Experiment 2 in general than in Experiment 1. This is likely
due to the influence of the unrelated reasoning task used as a distractor between ratings.
However, it is notable that coherence shifting was still found in Experiment 1 without the
distractor.
The finding that coherence shifting depended on which treatment participants
chose in Experiment 1 serious disease importance ratings was also found in Experiment 2
mild disease importance ratings (See Figures 2 and 6). Participants who chose Treatment
K in the Experiment 1 serious disease task and those who chose Treatment T in the
Experiment 2 mild disease task generally did not significantly change their importance
scores between the pre- and mid-choice times. Participants choosing M or N behaved in
line with the strong form of coherence shifting. This finding is unexpected, especially
given that participants facing the identical serious disease task in Experiment 2 showed
coherence shifting for choosers of both treatments. The simple-effects ANOVAs for these
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two tasks showed a significant main effect of treatment favored for those who did not
shift scores (i.e., Treatment K and T choosers), and showed a large difference between
attributes favoring each treatment at the pre-choice time. Alternatively, participants who
showed coherence shifting had similar importance ratings for both types of attribute at
the pre-choice time. This suggests that participants who were initially less conflicted,
showing large differences in importance between attributes favoring each alternative,
were more likely to choose one treatment (K or T) and did not need to shift their scores
for that alternative to seem dominant. Participants who began the task feeling more
conflicted were more likely to choose the other treatment (M or N) and shifted their
scores to make that treatment more attractive.
Between-task comparisons in Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 in that
aversive feelings towards the decision as a whole were stronger in the more emotionallysalient task, with scores being higher for the serious disease. This difference was found
despite tasks in Experiment 2 threatening the same higher-level goals, supporting the
prediction that increasing outcome unpleasantness also increases aversive feelings
towards the task as a whole. More correlations were found between coherence shifting
and emotion regulation strategies in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, but findings that
coherence shifting was related to post-choice confidence were not replicated.
Significant positive correlations between mild disease affect shifting and
expressivity, which is a component of emotion regulation, run counter to the finding that
higher coherence shifting did not significantly predict changes in physiological arousal.
This is likely due to the higher reliability of self-report measures in this study (affect
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ratings and the expressivity questionnaire) when compared to the physiological arousal
measure. Skin conductance is highly sensitive and often reflects artifacts such as bodily
movement and task-irrelevant arousal (Boucsein, 2012), and many participants were
excluded due to potential recording errors. In addition, the analyses of physiological data
were statistically underpowered when compared to the self-report measures, as the pilot
physiological data sample included less than 1/5th the participants in correlational
analyses.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of this dissertation was four-fold. The first goal was to examine what
decision information best predicts choice in a difficult health tradeoff decision that would
also elicit coherence shifting. This represents a new contribution to research on coherence
shifting, as past studies have focused on the impact of early preference for one alternative
or another on decision information ratings without examining the source of the initial
leaning. This project also integrated years of research on the extent to which affective
reactions predict choice. The second goal was to determine if coherence shifting occurs in
disease-treatment shared-decision tasks. These tasks, which represent a recent and
important field of decision-making, threaten higher-level goals and include more
emotionally salient outcomes than the decision tasks used in prior research (e.g., the job
task). In both of our studies, participants completed two decision tasks that differentially
threatened higher-level goals (Experiment 1) or had higher outcome unpleasantness
(Experiment 2). This led to a third goal—investigating whether the degree of coherence
shifting changed as higher-level goals are more threatened or as outcomes become less
pleasant. The fourth goal was to determine if coherence shifting served as a strategy to
reduce task-related negative affect and if it corresponds with previously-identified
emotion regulation strategies. These three research questions were investigated using
three tasks, including a relatively emotionally-neutral job selection task used in prior
research, a mild disease treatment choice that presented moderately unpleasant outcomes,
and a serious disease treatment choice that presented highly unpleasant outcomes. The
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disease tasks also threaten higher-level goals (e.g., health, survival) as opposed to
relatively lower-level goals in the job task (e.g., comfort, convenience).
Predicting Choice
In Hypothesis 1, I predicted that final choice would best be predicted by a model
including pre-choice affect towards outcomes and mid-choice feelings towards
alternatives. (See Table 9 for a summary of results regarding the predictive analyses and
coherence shifting within and across tasks.) Hypothesis 1 was only partially supported. In
every decision scenario, a model only including mid-choice feelings towards alternatives
either showed better fit or substantially equivalent fit to a model that included both prechoice affect ratings and mid-choice feeling towards alternatives. There was no case in
which adding pre-choice affect ratings substantially improved model fit. This finding
strongly supports the preference construction view of decision making and provides only
weak support for the view of revealed preferences. Choice was best predicted by feelings
towards alternatives after outcomes were presented in the decision context (e.g., arranged
into two treatments). Under the revealed preferences conception of choice, participants
should have based their decisions on their general predicted affect towards outcomes
regardless of the decision context, combining or comparing their pre-existing feelings and
reaching a decision that will match their overall preferences and long-term goals. The
finding that preferences measured outside the decision context did not improve the
prediction of participants’ choices is important for doctors and patients facing a shared
treatment decision because it indicates that patients are strongly influenced by the
presentation of decision information in the specific context of the alternatives given.
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Table 9: Summary of Experiment 1 and 2 Results.
Study 1 Job Task

Study 1 Serious
Disease Task

Study 2 Mild
Disease Task

Study 2 Serious
Disease Task

Best-Fit Model

Model 2.0

Models 2.1 & 2.0

Models 2.0 & 2.1

Model 2.0

AIC

99.05**

76.24** / 77.26**

68.39** / 68.45**

64.92**

Coherence
Shifting

ηG2

ηG2

ηG2

ηG2

Importance Shift

0.064**

0.016*

0.018*

0.025*

Affect Shift

0.017

0.023*

0.060*

0.118**

t
<*
*

M (SD)

M (SD)

5.90 (2.19)

~
<*

Prediction

Between-Task
Analyses
Aversive
Feelings
Importance ACS
Affect ACS

M (SD)
4.58 (1.86)
0.066
(0.069(
0.076
(0.056)

M (SD)

4.51 (1.81)

t
<*
*

0.052 (0.48)

0.084 (0.075)

~

0.083 (0.069)

0.110 (0.076)

0.101 (0.076)

~

0.113 (0.082)

5.68 (1.95)

* p < .05, ** p < .001. ~ = Not significantly different. AIC = Akaike’s Information
Criterion. ACS = Absolute Coherence Shifting.
Based on model fit, there was essentially no support for any model including prechoice attribute importance, such as lexicographic and weighted additive (AIC
differences from best-fitting model < 10; Burnham & Anderson, 2004). This suggests
that even for decisions that strongly impact a person’s future (e.g., career or health),
people may use fast, affect-based strategies over slower, more considered strategies that
weigh the importance of various attributes. However, participants received no coaching
in decision strategies. Doctors in real shared treatment decisions usually coach their
patients to use an attribute-based strategy (lexicographic decision making; Elwyn et al.,
2012), and actual cancer patients have been found to prioritize different attributes based
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on external life circumstances and goals (Wong et al., 2013). Also, the Wong et al.
finding suggest an alternative interpretation of the predictive-analysis findings—that
participants used fast heuristics because they were making a hypothetical decision.
Research using decisions with real consequences for participants is needed to clarify this
question.
In summation, predictive analysis of all 4 tasks provided support for a preference
construction view of decision-making and the use of affect as the primary decisionmaking strategy over conceptions of revealed preferences and more cognitively-effortful
importance-based strategies.
Coherence Shifting
Predictive analysis showed the impact of affect about decision alternatives on
choice. Coherence shifting represents influence in the opposing direction, where an early
preference towards one alternative will lead to changes in ratings of affect and
importance for decision information. In Hypothesis 2, I predicted that participants would
change ratings of affect towards outcomes and importance of attributes from the prechoice time (outside the decision context) to the mid-choice time (in the decision context)
in a manner that makes the chosen alternative more attractive and the non-chosen
alternative less attractive. Changes must exist between the pre- and mid-choice times in
order for coherence shifting to be a mechanism for choice rather than post-decision
shifting of scores (e.g., cognitive dissonance.)
Importance Scores. There was general support for coherence shifting in
importance scores across the four tasks in Experiments 1 and 2. Statistically significant
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coherence shifting in some form was found in all four tasks. The evidence for coherence
shifting of importance ratings was strongest for the job task and Study-2 serious disease
task (see Table 9). In these tasks, participants increased sores for attributes that favored
their choice and decreased scores (or increased them less strongly) for attributes that did
not favor their choice. For the other two tasks, overall effect sizes were negligible and
coherence shifting was only shown for participants who made one of the two possible
choices.
Affect Scores. The evidence for coherence shifting of outcome affect ratings was
stronger in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, significant affect shifting
was found for both tasks and effect sizes ranged from 0.06% to 0.12% of variance
explained (see Table 9). In Study 1, effect sizes were lower and coherence shifting was
not significant for the job task. This was probably due to the distractor tasks between
measurement periods being inadvertently omitted in Experiment 1 but included in
Experiment 2. The lack of distractor tasks in Experiment 1 may have allowed participants
ratings at the mid- and post-choice measurement periods to be influenced by their
memory of previous ratings.
In the serious disease tasks for both studies, participants increased all affect
ratings between the pre- and mid-choice times (main effect of time), but increased
outcome ratings more sharply for their chosen treatment than for their non-chosen
treatment. This represents the general form of coherence shifting, where affect ratings for
outcomes of the non-chosen alternative do not decrease over time but increase less than
outcomes of the chosen alternative. This pattern makes sense for the serious disease
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tasks, where all outcomes were highly unpleasant. The main effect of time may represent
a strategy of optimistically increasing ratings for all of these unpleasant outcomes when
they are experienced in the context of a decision relative to the decontextualized nondecision situation. An injection into the spinal fluid may seem less frightening when it is
seen as part of an effective treatment for a serious disease than when it is contemplated
alone. Participants did increase scores for their chosen treatment and decrease scores for
their non-chosen treatment in the mild disease task, which showed higher outcome
ratings in general than in the serious disease tasks.
Hypothesis 3, concerning the relationship between the strength of coherence
shifting and the corresponding sharpness of decrease in physiological arousal postshifting (aka a dose-response relationship), was not significantly supported in a pilot
sample. This will be examined further in an upcoming publication.
Between-Task and Exploratory Analysis
In Hypothesis 4, I predicted that tasks that had more unpleasant outcomes and
threatened higher level goals would lead to stronger aversive feelings. Carpenter and
colleagues (Carpenter et al., 2016; Carpenter and Niedenthal, 2017) proposed that
coherence shifting may serve as a strategy to reduce these aversive feelings rather than
being purely a strategy to make fast or accurate decisions. This hypothesis was supported
by comparisons between tasks in Experiments 1 and 2, which found that the task with
more emotionally salient outcomes (serious disease in both experiments) and threatened
higher-level goals (serious disease over job selection in Study 1) produced significantly

89

higher aversive feelings towards the decision as a whole than the less emotionally-salient
tasks (job selection, mild disease).
If coherence shifting serves to reduce aversive feelings, shifting of affect scores is
likely a direct way to reduce negative affect and this could lead to different patterns of
affect coherence shifting between tasks. Accordingly, I conducted an exploratory analysis
comparing coherence shifting between tasks. A significant difference in overall affect
shifting was found in in Experiment 1, where tasks differed in context, outcome salience,
and level of goals threatened. No differences were found between Experiment 2 tasks,
which shared a context and only differed in the unpleasantness of outcomes and the
disease treated.
In exploratory correlational analyses of Experiment 1, job task importance
shifting was positively correlated with cognitive reappraisal (ERQ), which is a more
cognitively effortful emotional regulation strategy then expressive suppression (Gross &
John, 2003). Shifting importance scores may represent a more abstract or explicit
cognitive strategy to regulate emotion than affect score shifting, making this strategy
similar to cognitive reappraisal. However, in the serious disease treatment decision in
Experiment 2, affect coherence shifting was correlated positively with multiple measures
of emotional expressivity from the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire, such that
participants who express negative emotions more openly and strongly engaged in
stronger coherence shifting regarding affect towards outcomes. Shifting their affect
ratings to reduce aversive feelings may be a more intuitive and effective emotion
regulation method for people who feel and express their emotions more strongly. The
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expressivity correlations found in the serious disease task did not replicate findings by
Carpenter et al. (2016) in the job task, indicating that further replication may be
necessary.
Is Coherence Shifting a Bias?
These findings fit together in a clear pattern. Participants in the current study
shifted their ratings of affect towards outcomes and importance of attributes during
decision making to align with their eventual final choice. Their final choice was predicted
well by feelings towards the two choices during decision making and poorly by affect
towards outcomes and importance ratings of attributes prior to decision making. By
down-weighting pre-choice affect and importance ratings and engaging in coherence
shifting, participants reduced aversive feelings towards the choices they made.
Although coherence shifting may help participants feel better about their choices,
it is not clear whether down-weighting initial preferences in order to construct new ones
during decision making is adaptive. Coherence shifting can be characterized as people
relying on initial hunches about their preferred choice rather than the actual strength of
evidence. Thus, it could lead to decisions that do not align with a person’s long-term
goals, especially given past research that has found that shifted preferences quickly revert
to baseline preferences after a simulated decision (Simon et al., 2008; Simon & Spiller,
2016). Imagine a person who is deciding between insulin injections and an oral
medication for Type-2 diabetes and who, outside of the context of a treatment decision,
strongly dislikes needles and is strongly motivated to reduce diabetes complications by
reducing blood sugar. Because insulin is more effective at reducing blood sugar, this
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person might develop an early preference for insulin during decision making, use
coherence shifting to perceive injections as less negative and eventually choose insulin.
This person might later find that in practice, his or her fear of needles is so strong that he
or she does not comply regularly with the regular injections.
Simon (2004) points out that coherence shifting can occur when people are
judging whether a factual claim is true based on evidence as well as during preference
decision making. Using the example of a jury making a judgment about the guilt of a
defendant, he suggests that the strict reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases may
encourage jurors to engage in coherence shifting when there is conflicting evidence
regarding guilt. In this context, Simon characterizes coherence shifting as a bias.
Cognitive Mechanisms of Coherence Shifting as Emotional Regulation
These studies provided mixed correlational evidence that coherence shifting may
serve as a strategy for emotion regulation. If shifting serves as a method to reduce
negative emotions, then coherence shifting would be evidence that people engage in
biased reasoning because they are trying to satisfy multiple goals: Reaching a decision
with the highest future utility while also minimizing present, short-term negative affect.
Marr (1982) would characterize this level of reasoning at the abstract computational
level, representing the goals a person is trying to accomplish by engaging in coherence
shifting.
However, these results do not directly address the specific cognitive mechanisms
by which coherence shifting reduces negative emotion, at Marr’s algorithmic level
(1982). Some evidence was found for a positive relationship between strength of shifting
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and decision confidence in Experiment 1. If participants were using effortful cognitive
processes to increase confidence or justify their decision, then it is likely that they would
have engaged in more shifting of relatively abstract attribute importance ratings than fast,
affective outcome ratings. However, effect sizes were stronger for affect shifting in
almost all tasks. In their third study, Carpenter et al. (2016) found less coherence shifting
when people were depleted of regulatory resources, disrupting emotional processing.
Future research could use secondary tasks that specifically tax cognitive resources to
determine if systematic or affective processes underlie coherence shifting.
Alternatively, participants may attempt to reduce negative emotion by reducing
perceived risk. Risk is usually not considered in models of multi-attribute decisionmaking, which generally treat outcomes as deterministic (Hastie & Dawes, 2010).
However, both the simulated disease tasks in this experiment and real health decisions
involve some level of uncertainty. Future experiments could measure perceived risk at
multiple rating times or manipulate the probability of outcomes to examine well-studied
biases in risky (probabilistic) decision-making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Impact and Contributions
The experiments reported above provide multiple new contributions to the study
of coherence shifting and preference construction, along with an avenue towards
important applications. Coherence shifting was proposed by Simon et al. (Simon, 2004)
as an example of a bi-directional interaction between choice and preferences, where an
initial leaning towards a certain alternative in a difficult trade-off decision will lead to
changes in perceived preferences to make that alternative more dominant. This is in the
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opposite direction of many revealed-preference models, which suggest that stable longterm preferences or revealed preferences for decision information are constructed
unidirectionally into choice. In these experiments, I have examined changes in both of
these directions, incorporating prior research on the construction of preferences from both
prior and mid-decision affect. The predictive findings in both experiments provided
support for preference construction as equal or superior to revealed or stable preferences
for predicting choice, and that affect-based models have much stronger fit in predicting
decisions than several more cognitively-effortful attribute-based decision strategies.
These findings suggest that the initial leaning which participants will shift scores to
support is based on affect towards alternatives as a whole, only assessed after that have
seen outcomes within a decision context.
These experiments have also replicated coherence shifting in shared health
treatment decisions for a mild and a serious disease. These tasks are more emotionally
salient than the job task (e.g., Simon et al., 2004; Carpenter et al., 2016) and mock-jury
civil court tasks (Simon, 2004) utilized in prior coherence shifting experiments, and were
designed to be specifically balanced on outcome unpleasantness rather than abstract task
information. They also personally threaten higher-level goals such as health and survival,
as opposed to a criminal jury who may be contemplating another person’s future.
Coherence shifting appears to follow different patterns depending on the emotional
salience of the outcomes and the level of goals threatened by the task (e.g., comfort vs.
health and survival), which supports past findings in preference construction (Luce,
1998). These findings were also replicated despite using more conservative and accurate
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analyses and measures of effect size such as omnibus MANOVAS and generalized η2
(Bakeman, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidel, 2018).
In addition, these simulated disease tasks represent a first step towards applying
coherence shifting findings to an important real-world decision context. These tasks were
designed to share aspects with difficult health treatment tradeoff decisions using
outcomes identified from real health treatments and diseases. These decisions are
increasingly shared between patients and doctors (Elwyn et al., 2010; Makoul &
Clayman, 2006), so understanding the impact of processes like coherence shifting is
important to understanding how patients make these decisions.
Given the suggestion earlier that coherence shifting is a cognitive bias, shared
decision-making templates and tools could be designed to reduce coherence shifting
engaged in by patients while still providing them with assurances that will reduce their
aversive feelings and increase their confidence in the effectiveness of their selected
treatment. For example, based on the correlation between affect-shifting and final
decision confidence and the low tendency to utilize more effortful, attribute-based
strategies, doctors could ask patients what attributes of a decision are more important to
them before presenting them with the treatments in a decision context. In addition,
decision tools could be designed that allow participants to engage in coherence shifting
consciously and openly, indicating their initial preferences outside of a decision context
and then actively and visibly changing those scores once the decision context has been
presented. Such a decision tool may help patients and doctors avoid unconscious bias and
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provide feedback during shifting in order to avoid decisions that do not align with longterm goals.
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APPENDICES
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Appendix A: Instructions and Affect Scores for Tradeoff Development Pilot
General Instructions
In the following survey, you will be asked to place items into categories. This will
include one long scale and several shorter scales.
These scales are RELATIVE. This means that items only need to be higher or
lower on the scale than items in the categories next to them.
The directions WILL BE DIFFERENT for each question. Please read them each
time.

Figure A1: Pilot rating scales. “I don’t know what this means” was not present in all scales.

98

Scale 1: Side Effects
Instructions: “The following items represent possible side effects for treatments
for a disease. Please drag these side effects into one of 7 categories based on your
immediate emotional reaction to them. Scores closer to 7 mean more unpleasant. If you
don't know the meaning of an item, please place it in the "I don't know what this means"
group.”

Original Scale Options: No side effects, Cough, Runny nose, Chills, Bruising,
Congestion, Itching, Loss of appetite, Sore throat, Skin blemishes, Sweats, Indigestion,
Blisters, Heartburn, Muscle cramping, Muscle spasms, Rash, Dizziness, Headache, Lack
of coordination, Dehydration, Puffy face, Scarring, Bronchitis, Nausea, Tremors, Blood
in stool, Cyst, High fever, Paranoia, Weakness in limbs, Prolonged double vision,
Temporary hearing loss, Bone marrow loss, Tuberculosis

Scale 2: Administration of Treatment
Instructions: “The following items represent the administration methods for a
variety of treatments for a disease. Please drag these items into 7 categories based on how
unpleasant they would be to experience. Scores closer to 7 mean more unpleasant. If you
don't know the meaning of an item, please place it in the "I don't know what this means"
group.”
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Original Scale Options: One pill only, One pill per day for 10 days, One pill
immediately then one pill each at 6 24 and 48 hours later, One pill 3 times a day for 14
days, Ointment in nostrils 2 times per day for 5 days, 2 inhalations 2 times a day for 10
days, One pill 2 times a day for 5 days, One pill per day for 30 days, Oral rinse once per
hour for 3 hours, One injection per week for 3 weeks, One intramuscular shot, then one
pill 2 times a day for 7 days, One intramuscular injection, One injection in the buttocks,
IV drip 4 hours a day for 5 days, One injection into the spinal fluid, Continuous IV drip
for 7 days, Immediate hospitalization

Scale 3: Out-Of-Pocket Cost
Instructions: “The following items represent the out-of-pocket costs of treatments
for a disease. This is the total amount you would personally need to pay, even if you have
insurance. Please drag these items into 7 categories based on how you would feel if you
had to pay that amount of money. Scores closer to 7 mean more unpleasant.”

Original Scale Options: No cost, $7.00, $11.00, $20.00, $34.00, $60.00, $104.00,
$180.00, $320.00, $550.00, $960.00, $2,900.00, $1,700.00, $8,900.00, $15,500.00,
$5,100.00

Scale 4: Duration of Symptoms
Instructions: “The following items represent the time that you will still feel
disease symptoms over the course of treatment. Please drag these items into 7 categories
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based on how unpleasant they would be to experience. Scores closer to 7 mean more
unpleasant.”

Original Scale Options: 12 hours, 24 hours, 48 hours, 5 days, 7 days, 14 days, 10
days, 1 day of hospitalization, 3 weeks, 1 month, 3 days of hospitalization, 7 days of
hospitalization, 2 months, 1 month of hospitalization

Scale 5: Efficacy
Instructions: “The following items represent the efficacy of a treatment, or chance
you will be cured of a disease after 7 days. Please drag these items into 7 categories based
on how you would feel if you were offered a treatment with this efficacy. Scores closer to
7 mean more unpleasant.”

Original Scale Options: 99%, 95%, 91%, 83%, 87%, 71%, 79%, 75%, 63%, 67%,
55%, 59%, 47%, 51%, 43% (same as without treatment)

Scale 6: Mortality
Instructions: “The following items represent the mortality rate, or that people will
die from a disease even if they have received a treatment.

Please drag these items into 7 categories based on how you would feel if you were
offered a treatment with this mortality rate. Scores closer to 7 mean more unpleasant.”
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Original Scale Items: 0.00%, 0.50%, 2.00%, 3.50%, 5.00%, 6.50%, 8.00%,
9.50%, 11.00%, 14.00%, 12.50%, 15.50%, 17.00%, 18.50%, 20.0% (without treatment)
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Appendix B: Predictive Models of Choice
The following regression models examine predictors of choice that are relevant to
specific proposed conscious or unconscious strategies of decision making. These models
are all based on simplifying assumptions and do not represent the full process of decision
making proposed by each theory. This is necessary due to several statistical and
methodological concerns. First, choice is only recorded at the person level. It is possible
to distinguish between predictors in any give category (outcomes, attributes) at a
between-subjects level, but the effect of these predictors on choice cannot be
distinguished at a within-subjects level. For example, I might find that the importance of
side effects is more predictive of choice across all participants than the importance of
efficacy, but I cannot say that side effect importance was more predictive than efficacy
for one person’s final choice. This prevents modeling any processes where participants
do not use all decision information, such as the lexicographic decision-making (Hastie &
Dawes, 2010) or stochastic threshold models such as the diffusion decision model
(Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Second, multiple self-report measures of affect and
importance are likely too slow and explicit to capture rapid attentional or neurobiological
processes like the diffusion decision model and somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005).
This appendix includes the four primary models of interest, necessary statistical
variations, and an explanation of simplifying assumptions for each model. The following
models use notation for a decision between 2 alternatives (A & B) described through 8
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outcomes within 4 attributes. See Table B1 below for this decision in a matrix form along
with a summary of measures.

Table B1: Decision Matrix.
(Measure)

Alternative A

(Measure)

Alternative B

(Measure)

Attribute 1

(Importance1)

Outcome A1

(AffectA1)

Outcome B1

(AffectB1)

Attribute 2

(Importance2)

Outcome A2

(AffectA2)

Outcome B2

(AffectB2)

Attribute 3

(Importance3)

Outcome A3

(AffectA3)

Outcome B3

(AffectB3)

Attribute 4

(Importance4)

Outcome A4

(AffectA4)

Outcome B4

(AffectB4)

Feelings

Positivity A

(PosA)

Positivity B

(PosB)

towards

Arousal A

(AroA)

Arousal B

(AroB)

Alternatives

Dominance A

(DomA)

Dominance B

(DomB)

Model 1: Affect Heuristic (Outcome Based)
This model is based on risky decision research by Charpentier et al.
(2016), who found that predicted happiness towards monetary outcomes rated prior to
any decision predicted choice more reliably than the values themselves or values
transformed according to known influences on decision-making (e.g., framing effects). In
the context of this project, this corresponds to affect towards the 8 outcomes rated at the
pre-choice time, producing the following model. (An aggregated version of this model,
Model 1.1, will be examined under Model 2.)
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Model 1.0: Only Outcomes
ln �

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
� = β0 + β1 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 + β2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 + β3 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴3 + β4 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4
1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
+ β5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵1 + β6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵2 + β7 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵3 + β8 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵4

where PA is the probability of choosing Alternative A, (1 - PA) is the probability
of choosing Alternative B, and each Affect term is affect towards an outcome in Table
B1.
Model 2: Affect Heuristic (Outcomes and Alternatives)
Schlösser et al. (2013) measured positivity, arousal, and dominance
towards both outcomes and alternatives. They found that a model using affect towards
alternatives was strongly predictive of choice and was not significantly improved by the
addition of outcomes as predictors. Additionally, they found that the relationship between
outcome affect and choice was mediated by affect towards alternatives. The first two
comparisons are relatively easy to replicate. First, Model 1 will be compared with a
model containing only feelings towards alternatives A and B:
Model 2.0: Only Alternatives
𝑃𝑃

ln �1−𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 � = β0 + β1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + β3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + β4 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 + β5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 +

β6 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵

𝐴𝐴

where Pos, Aro, Dom are Positivity, Arousal, and Dominance ratings for

Alternatives A or B.
Model 2.0 could be compared with a model including these 6 alternative ratings
and the 8 outcome affect ratings:
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Model 2.1: Outcomes and Alternatives
ln �

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
� = β0 + β1−4 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1−4) + β5 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + β7 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴
1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴

+ β8−11 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵1−4 ) + β12 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 + β13 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 + β14 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵

Mediation analysis is more difficult. Including all possible outcome-by-alternative
affect mediation terms would result in a model that is difficult to interpret and
inappropriate given the lack of attribute- or outcome-level within-person variance in final
choice. Also, positivity, arousal, and dominance are sufficiently different constructs that
they are not easy to aggregate. Schlösser et al. (2013) simplified their model by
conducting cluster analysis on alternative ratings and using cluster membership as
predictors. To reduce the complexity of the model and still differentially examine the
impact of positivity, arousal, and dominance, affect towards outcomes will be aggregated
into predictors for each alternative using the following formulas:
4

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑖𝑖=1
4

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 = � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝑖𝑖=1

A model using only these two aggregate terms as predictors will be compared
with model 1 to determine if using these aggregate terms results in a loss of fit or
explained variance.
Model 1.1: Only Aggregated Outcomes
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
� = β0 + β1 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + β2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵
ln �
1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
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For all tasks in both experiments, Model 1.1 showed substantially worse fit than
model 1.0, making it inappropriate to examine interactions using aggregated terms. Two
additional models are proposed to examine the interaction between pre-choice
alternatives, but were not utilized for either experiment:
Model 2.2: Aggregated Outcomes + Alternatives
ln �

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
� = β0 + β1 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + β2 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β3 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + β4 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + β5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 + β6 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵
1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
+ β7 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵 + β8 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵

These models can be compared with a model aggregated outcome terms, feelings
towards alternatives, and six alternative by outcome interaction terms:
Model 2.3: Outcome x Alternative Interaction
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
� = β0 + β1 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + β2 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 + β3 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + β4 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 + β5 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 )
ln �
1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
+ β6 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ) + β7 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ) + β8 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 + β9 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵

+ β10 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 + β11 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 + β12 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 ) + β13 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 )

+ β14 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 )

According to the findings of Schlösser et al. (2013), with some theoretical support
from stochastic and affective choice construction models, Model 2.3 should show the best
performance and interaction terms should be significant predictors of choice.
Model 3: Attribute-Based Decision Strategies
Lexicographic decision making and elimination by aspects (see Hastie &
Dawes, 2010) both rely on selecting the most important attribute before examining
outcomes to make a decision. This fits with the shared decision making instructions from
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Elwyn et al (2012), who instruct patients to think about what is most important to them.
These decision-making strategies include a temporal sequence for prioritizing
information in decision-making. A person first examines the most important attribute and
then either selects the alternative with the best outcome (lexicographic) or rejects
alternatives with unacceptable outcomes (elimination by aspects). Thresholds for
“winning,” “unacceptable,” or “acceptable” are subjective and not defined here. If a
choice cannot be reached through one alternative with these methods, the person then
makes comparisons on the second most important alternative. First, a simplified model
using only the 4 importance weights as predictors will be used to evaluate the impact of
attribute importance in general.
Model 3.0: Only Importance
ln �

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
� = β0 + β1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 + β2 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼2 + β3 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼3
1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
+ β4 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼4

where each Importance term represents an Attribute in Table B1.
In order to examine lexicographic decision making, a model using only the two
affect outcome ratings for the attribute rated most important for each participant. If more
than one attribute receives the highest importance rating, the outcome ratings for those
attributes will be averaged.
Model 3.1 Lexicographic
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
� = β0 + β1 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + β2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵:𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
ln �
1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
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Model 4: Weighted Additive Strategy
The weighted additive strategy instructs that importance weights for attributes
should be multiplied by utility ratings for outcomes, and these products should be
summed for alternatives to produce overall alternative scores (Hastie & Dawes, 2010),
but without being instructed participants cannot be assumed to use this exact process.
Instead, a model representing weighted additive will include 8 outcomes ratings, 4
attribute importance ratings, and 8 outcome-by-attribute interaction terms. (It is necessary
to keep the 12 main effect terms in the model to assess the interactions.) If using
importance to weight outcome affect ratings is the most common decision-making
method, this model should explain the most variance. In order to examine the interaction,
we must first examine a model only including main effects. This is a combination of
Models 1.0 and 3.0:
Model 4.0: Importance and Outcomes
ln �

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
� = β0 + β1−4 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1−4 ) + β5−8 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1−4 )
1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
+ β9−12 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵1−4 )

Adding the interaction terms provides the full weighted additive model (next
page):

Model 4.1: Importance x Outcomes Interaction
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ln �

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
� = β0 + β1−4 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1−4 ) + β5−8 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1−4 )
1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴

+ β9−12 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵1−4 ) + β13 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 )

+ β14 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵1 ) + β15 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼2 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 )

+ β16 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼2 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵2 ) + β17 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼3 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3 )

+ β18 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼3 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵3 ) + β19 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼4 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴4 )
+ β20 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡4 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵4 )
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Appendix C: Experiment 1 Predictive Analysis Regression Coefficients

Table C1.1: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Serious disease pre- and mid-choice affect models.
Model 1: Affect (Charpentier)

Model 2.0: Affect (Mid-choice)

Model 2.1: Affect (Schlösser)

Predictors

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

K Admin

-0.09

0.09

0.92

[0.77,1.08]

-

-

-

-

-0.13

0.20

0.88

[0.57,1.31]

K Side Effects

-0.08

0.23

0.92

[0.58,1.43]

-

-

-

-

0.37

0.51

1.45

[0.52,4.09]

K Efficacy

-0.21

0.13

0.81

[0.62,1.03]

-

-

-

-

-0.57

0.31

0.57

[0.29,0.98]

K Duration

-0.05

0.12

0.95

[0.75,1.20]

-

-

-

-

0.33

0.26

1.39

[0.85,2.47]

M Admin

0.19*

0.09

1.20

[1.01,1.46]

-

-

-

-

0.57*

0.24

1.77

[1.17,3.05]

M Side Effects

0.05

0.14

1.05

[0.78,1.39]

-

-

-

-

-0.15

0.39

0.86

[0.39,1.88]

M Efficacy

0.15

0.14

1.16

[0.89,1.54]

-

-

-

-

0.54

0.32

1.71

[0.95,3.41]

M Duration

-0.09

0.08

0.92

[0.77,1.08]

-

-

-

-

-0.51*

0.21

0.60

[0.38,0.86]

K Positivity

-

-

-

-

1.42**

0.30

4.14

[2.45,8.18]

2.02**

0.49

7.53

[3.36,24.02]

K Arousal

-

-

-

-

0.66*

0.27

1.93

[1.17,3.50]

0.77*

0.38

2.16

[1.09,5.01]

K Dominance

-

-

-

-

0.73**

0.23

2.08

[1.37,3.38]

0.96**

0.32

2.61

[1.49,5.39]

M Positivity

-

-

-

-

-0.97**

0.32

0.38

[0.19,0.66]

-1.51**

0.50

0.22

[0.07,0.50]

M Arousal

-

-

-

-

-0.87**

0.32

0.42

[0.21,0.75]

-0.86*

0.40

0.42

[0.17,0.87]

M Dominance

-

-

-

-

-0.56*

0.25

0.57

[0.34,0.92]

-0.92*

0.37

0.40

[0.17,0.78]

Constant

-0.32

0.92

0.73

[0.11,4.32]

-2.79

1.75

0.06

[0.00,1.68]

0.62

2.68

1.87

[0.01,544.14]

N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
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Table C1.2: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Serious disease pre-choice attribute-based models.
Model 3.0: Attribute-based
Model 3.1: Lexicographic
Predictors
B
SE B OR
95%CI OR
B
SE B
OR 95%CI OR
K Admin
K Side Effects
K Efficacy
K Duration
M Admin
M Side Effects
M Efficacy
M Duration
Admin Importance
-0.13 0.12
0.88 [0.69,1.10]
Side Effect Importance
0.31 0.17
1.36 [0.99,1.94]
Efficacy Importance
-0.34 0.18
0.71 [0.49,1.02]
Duration Importance
0.17 0.14
1.18 [0.91,1.55]
K Important Outcome
-0.44**
-0.44
0.64 [0.50,0.79]
M Important Outcome
0.46**
0.46
1.58 [1.19,2.18]
Constant
-0.32 1.61
0.72 [0.03,17.01]
-0.02
-0.02
0.98 [0.53,1.82]
N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
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Table C1.3: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Serious disease pre-choice weighted additive models.
Model 4.0: W.Add (main effects)
Model 4.1: W.Add (interaction)
Predictors
B
SE B OR 95%CI OR
B
SE B OR
95%CI OR
K Admin
-0.05
0.09 0.95 [0.80,1.14]
-0.28
0.31
0.76
[0.40,1.38]
K Side Effects
-0.19
0.25 0.82 [0.50,1.32]
-2.74
1.88
0.06
[0.00,1.78]
K Efficacy
-0.26* 0.13 0.77 [0.59,0.99]
0.67
1.00
1.95
[0.28,15.97]
K Duration
0.00
0.12 1.00 [0.78,1.28]
1.24*
0.62
3.46
[1.08,12.73]
M Admin
0.16
0.10 1.18 [0.97,1.44]
-0.72
0.41
0.49
[0.20,1.03]
M Side Effects
0.07
0.15 1.07 [0.78,1.43]
0.54
0.85
1.72
[0.31,9.13]
M Efficacy
0.19
0.15 1.21 [0.91,1.63]
-0.41
1.12
0.66
[0.06,5.79]
M Duration
-0.06
0.09 0.94 [0.78,1.13]
-0.49
0.42
0.61
[0.26,1.36]
Admin Importance
-0.12
0.13 0.89 [0.68,1.15]
0.25
0.24
1.29
[0.83,2.15]
Side Effect Importance
0.29
0.18 1.34 [0.96,1.92]
1.79
1.15
6.00
[0.85,72.26]
Efficacy Importance
-0.34
0.20 0.71 [0.48,1.04]
-0.20
0.39
0.82
[0.38,1.79]
Duration Importance
0.16
0.16 1.17 [0.86,1.62]
-0.53
0.40
0.59
[0.25,1.25]
K Admin x Importance
1.21
2.36
3.35
[0.03,386.12]
6
K Side Effects x Importance 15.39
11.97 4.83*10 [0.00,3.53*1017]
K Efficacy x Importance
-4.79
5.30
0.01
[0.00,227.80]
K Duration x Importance
-10.20* 4.74
0.00
[0.00,0.25]
M Admin x Importance
-6.89* 3.09
0.00
[0.00,0.28]
M Side Effects x Importance 2.92
5.58
18.54
[0.00,1,187,352.30]
M Efficacy x Importance
-3.01
6.13
0.05
[0.00,6,579.19]
M Duration x Importance
-4.08
3.15
0.02
[0.00,6.91]
Constant
-0.15
1.82 0.86 [0.02,31.43] -10.77 9.33
0.00
[0.00,267.10]
N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. W.Add = Weighted Additive.
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Table C2.1: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Job task pre- and mid-choice affect models.
Model 1: Affect (Charpentier)

Model 2.0: Affect (Mid-choice)

Model 2.1: Affect (Schlösser)

Predictors

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

Splendor Salary

-0.30*

0.14

0.74

[0.56,0.96]

-

-

-

-

-0.13

0.20

0.88

[0.57,1.31]

Splendor Office
Splendor
Vacation
Splendor
Commute

-0.29

0.17

0.75

[0.52,1.01]

-

-

-

-

0.37

0.51

1.45

[0.52,4.09]

-0.22*

0.11

0.80

[0.64,0.99]

-

-

-

-

-0.57

0.31

0.57

[0.29,0.98]

-0.08

0.15

0.92

[0.68,1.24]

-

-

-

-

0.33

0.26

1.39

[0.85,2.47]

BB Salary

0.52**

0.17

1.69

[1.23,2.41]

-

-

-

-

0.57*

0.24

1.77

[1.17,3.05]

BB Office

0.23

0.13

1.26

[0.98,1.66]

-

-

-

-

-0.15

0.39

0.86

[0.39,1.88]

BB Vacation

0.13

0.15

1.14

[0.86,1.56]

-

-

-

-

0.54

0.32

1.71

[0.95,3.41]

BB Commute

0.25

0.13

1.28

[1.00,1.68]

-

-

-

-

-0.51*

0.21

0.60

[0.38,0.86]

K Positivity

-

-

-

-

1.42**

0.30

4.14

[2.45,8.18]

-

-

-

-

K Arousal

-

-

-

-

0.66*

0.27

1.93

[1.17,3.50]

-

-

-

-

K Dominance

-

-

-

-

0.73**

0.23

2.08

[1.37,3.38]

2.02**

0.49

7.53

[3.36,24.02]

M Positivity

-

-

-

-

-0.97**

0.32

0.38

[0.19,0.66]

0.77*

0.38

2.16

[1.09,5.01]

M Arousal

-

-

-

-

-0.87**

0.32

0.42

[0.21,0.75]

0.96**

0.32

2.61

[1.49,5.39]

M Dominance

-

-

-

-

-0.56*

0.25

0.57

[0.34,0.92]

-1.51**

0.50

0.22

[0.07,0.50]

Constant

-0.76

0.82

0.47

[0.09,2.31]

-2.79

1.75

0.06

[0.00,1.68]

-0.86*

0.40

0.42

[0.17,0.87]

N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
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Table C2.2: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Job task pre-choice attribute-based models.
Model 3.0: Attribute-based
Model 3.1: Lexicographic
Predictors
B
SE B OR
95%CI OR
B
SE B
OR 95%CI OR
Splendor Salary

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Splendor Office

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Splendor Vacation

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Splendor Commute

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

BB Salary

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

BB Office

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

BB Vacation

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

BB Commute

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Salary Importance

-0.03

0.20

0.97

[0.66,1.44]

-

-

-

-

Office Importance

-0.12

0.15

0.89

[0.65,1.20]

-

-

-

-

Vacation Importance

0.31*

0.15

1.37

[1.02,1.87]

-

-

-

-

Commute Importance

0.05

0.13

1.05

[0.83,1.35]

-

-

-

-

Splendor Important Outcome

-

-

-

-

-0.10

-0.10

0.90

[0.74,1.10]

BB Important Outcome

-

-

-

-

0.07

0.07

1.07

[0.89,1.30]

Constant

-1.79

1.77

0.17

[0.00,5.18]

-0.71**

-0.71

0.49

[0.28,0.82]

N = 112. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
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Table C2.3: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 1 Job task pre-choice weighted additive models.
Model 4.0: W.Add (main effects)
Model 4.1: W.Add (interaction)
Predictors
B
SE B OR 95%CI OR
B
SE B OR
95%CI OR
Splendor Salary

-0.35*

0.15

0.70

[0.51,0.93]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

Splendor Office

-0.28

0.17

0.76

[0.52,1.05]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

Splendor Vacation

-0.20

0.11

0.82

[0.65,1.01]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

Splendor Commute

-0.14

0.16

0.87

[0.64,1.19]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

BB Salary

0.60**

0.19

1.82

[1.29,2.73]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

BB Office

0.20

0.14

1.22

[0.94,1.62]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

BB Vacation

0.07

0.16

1.08

[0.79,1.49]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

BB Commute

0.34*

0.17

1.40

[1.02,2.00]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

Salary Importance

-0.11

0.24

0.89

[0.55,1.44]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

Office Importance

-0.09

0.18

0.92

[0.64,1.32]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

Vacation Importance

0.18

0.18

1.20

[0.84,1.73]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

Commute Importance

0.30

0.18

1.35

[0.96,1.97]

-2.15

2.09

0.12

[0.00,6.58]

Splendor Salary x Importance

-

-

-

-

1.69

7.15

5.41

[0.00,4.83x106]

8.35

5.58

4,249.12

[0.10,4.62x108]

2.62

3.55

13.78

[0.01,15,120.54]

-13.25**

5.12

0.00

[0.00,0.02]

-3.10

7.89

0.04

[0.00,3.61x105]

0.86

4.13

2.37

[0.00,9,129.14]

-4.83

3.83

0.01

[0.00,13.23]

1.03

3.65

2.81

[0.00,5,338.29]

6.37

0.95

[0.00,2.23x105]

Splendor Office x Importance
Splendor Vacation x Importance
Splendor Commute x Importance
BB Salary x Importance
BB Office x Importance
BB Vacation x Importance
BB Commute x Importance

Constant
-2.15
2.09
0.12
[0.00,6.58]
-0.05
N = 112. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. W.Add = Weighted Additive.
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Appendix D: Experiment 1 (Serious Disease and Job) Coherence Shifting and Exploratory Statistics.
Table D1.1: Coherence shifting of serious disease importance scores by choice, time, and favored treatment: MANOVA results.
Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

ηG2

3-way (Choice by Time by Favored)

0.066

4.11*

2, 116

0.019

0.016

2-way (Choice by Time)

0.154

10.52**

2, 116

<.001

0.042

2-way (Choice by Favored)

0.043

2.59

2, 116

0.079

0.010

2-way (Time by Favored)

0.060

3.73*

2, 116

0.027

0.015

Choice (Main Effect)

0.001

0.04

2, 116

0.962

0.000

Time (Main Effect)

0.572

77.43**

2, 116

<.001

0.237

Favored Treatment (Main Effect)

0.572

77.43**

2, 116

<.001

0.026

N = 119. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared.

Table D1.2: Coherence shifting of serious disease importance scores: Simple-effects univariate tests.
Univariate

N

2-way (Time by Favored)
F
Df
p
ηG2

Time
F

Df

p

ηG2

Treatment Favored (K vs M)
F
df
p
ηG2

Chose K

77

2.12

1, 76

0.150

0.014

0.035

1, 76

0.852

0.000

28.87**

1, 76

<.001

0.160

Chose M

42

5.40*

1, 41

0.025

0.062

4.60*

1, 41

0.038

0.053

2.88

1, 41

0.097

0.034

N = 119. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared.
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Table D2.1: Coherence shifting of serious disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Interactions.
3-way (Choice by Time by Treatment)
Multivariate
Affect
Univariate

Pillai’s Trace
0.089

2-way (Choice by Time)

F
2.89*
F

Df
4, 119
Df

p
0.023
p

ηG2
0.023
ηG2

Pillai’s Trace
0.135

F
4.65*
F

Df
4, 119
Df

Admin

1.43

1, 122

0.233

1.43

10.76*

1, 122

Side Effects

1.22

1, 122

0.272

1.22

Efficacy

0.12

1, 122

0.731

0.12

Duration

9.20*

1, 122

0.003

9.20

0.002
0.002
0.000
0.015

2-way (Choice by Treatment)

0.07
5.33*
3.20

p
0.002
p

ηG2
0.036
ηG2

0.042
1, 122 0.786 0.000
1, 122 0.023 0.011
1, 122 0.076 0.011
0.001

2-way (Time by Treatment)

Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

P

ηG2

Affect

0.039

1.21

4, 119

0.312

0.009

0.454

24.74**

4, 119

<.001

0.162

Univariate

F

df

p

ηG2

F

Df

P

ηG2

Admin

0.00

1, 122

0.967

0.000

5.10*

1, 122

0.026

0.006

Side Effects

0.86

Efficacy

2.22

1, 122

0.356

0.001

22.06**

1, 122

<.001

0.033

1, 122

0.139

0.005

90.22**

1, 122

<.001

0.068

Duration

1.90

1, 122

0.171

0.003

0.40

1, 122

0.526

0.001

N = 124. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared, K = Treatment K, M = Treatment M. See table 3 for specific outcomes.
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Table D2.2: Coherence shifting of serious disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Main effects.
Choice

Time

Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

df

p

ηG

Affect

0.004

0.45

4, 119

0.770

0.004

Univariate

F

df

p

ηG2

Admin

0.00

2

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

P

ηG2

0.819

134.81**

4, 119

<.001

0.513

F

Df

P

ηG2

0.000
1.11 1, 122 0.294 0.002
0.75 1, 122 0.389 0.002
0.55 1, 122 0.461 0.001

Side Effects
Efficacy
Duration

1, 122

0.990

Multivariate

Treatment (K vs M)

Affect

Pillai’s Trace

F

df

p

ηG2

Univariate

0.353

16.26**

4, 119

<.001

0.113

Admin

F

Df

p

ηG2

Side Effects

5.64*

1, 122

0.019

0.008

Efficacy

25.86**

1, 122

<.001

0.042

Duration

6.59*

1, 122

0.011

0.016

Multivariate

41.28*

1, 122

<.001

0.062

0.224
161.86** 1, 122 <.001 0.366
362.78** 1, 122 <.001 0.427
23.69**
1, 122 <.001 0.078
73.75**

1, 122

<.001

N = 124. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared, K = Treatment K, M = Treatment M. See Table 3 for specific outcomes.
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Table D3: Coherence shifting of job task importance scores by choice, time, and job favored: MANOVA results.

Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

ηG2

3-way (Choice by Time by Favored)

0.222

16.36**

2, 115

<.001

0.064

2-way (Choice by Time)

0.110

7.13*

2, 115

0.001

0.028

2-way (Choice by Favored)

0.017

0.99

2, 115

0.374

0.004

2-way (Time by Favored)

0.213

15.57**

2, 115

<.001

0.057

Choice (Main Effect)

0.032

1.93

2, 115

0.150

0.008

Time (Main Effect)

0.612

90.70**

2, 115

<.001

0.261

Job Favored (Main Effect)

0.009

0.52

2, 115

0.596

0.002

N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared.
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Table D4.1: Coherence shifting of job task affect scores by choice, time, and job: Interactions.
3-way (Choice by Time by Job)
Multivariate
Affect
Univariate

Pillai’s Trace
0.073

F
2.22
F

Df
4, 113
Df

2-way (Choice by Time)
p
0.072
p

ηG2
0.017
ηG2

Pillai’s Trace
0.298

F
12.00**
F

0.001
5.53* 1, 116 0.020 0.006
1.21
1, 116 0.273 0.001
2.54
1, 116 0.114 0.003

Salary

0.37

Office
Vacation
Commute

1, 116

P
<.001
p

ηG2
0.092
ηG2

0.058
14.24** 1, 116 <.001 0.071
4.85*
1, 116 0.030 0.023
6.05*
1, 116 0.015 0.026
14.90**

0.545

2-way (Choice by Job)

Df
4, 113
Df
1, 116

<.001

2-way (Time by Job)

Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

ηG2

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

P

ηG2

Affect

0.057

1.69

4, 113

0.156

0.013

0.299

12.06**

4, 113

<.001

0.084

Univariate

F

df

p

ηG2

F

Df

P

ηG2

Salary

0.67

1, 116

0.414

0.001

14.90**

1, 116

<.001

0.020

Office

3.74

1, 116

0.056

0.004

5.85*

1, 116

0.017

0.007

Vacation

0.58

1, 116

0.446

0.001

4.72*

1, 116

0.032

0.004

Commute

0.60

1, 116

0.440

0.001

22.98**

1, 116

<.001

0.026

N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. Spl. = Splendor, BB = Bonnie’s Best
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Table D4.2: Coherence shifting of job task affect scores by choice, time, and job: Main effects.
Choice

Time

Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

df

p

ηG

Affect

0.068

2.06

4, 113

0.091

0.016

Univariate

F

df

p

ηG2

Admin

0.08

2

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

ηG2

0.938

427.01**

4, 113

<.001

0.765

F

Df

p

ηG2

873.50**

1, 116

<.001

0.773

627.56**

1, 116

<.001

0.757

183.18**

1, 116

<.001

0.468

873.50**

1, 116

<.001

0.716

0.000
2.23
1, 116 0.138 0.002
0.01
1, 116 0.910 0.000
5.74* 1, 116 0.018 0.010

Side Effects
Efficacy
Duration

1, 116

0.783

Job (Spl vs BB)
Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

df

p

ηG2

Affect

0.176

6.04**

4, 113

<.001

0.044

Univariate

F

Df

p

ηG2

Admin

0.05

1, 116

0.829

0.000

Side Effects

16.39**

1, 116

<.001

0.015

Efficacy

0.18

1, 116

0.675

0.000

Duration

4.36*

1, 116

0.039

0.005

N = 118. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared. Spl. = Splendor, BB = Bonnie’s Best
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Table D5: Aversive feelings and overall strength of Coherence Shifting in the Serious Disease Task and the Job Task.
Serious Disease
Task
Job Task
r (Between- PairedFeeling
M (SD)
M (SD)
Task)
samples t df
P
Anxious
5.90 (2.00)
4.67 (1.84)
0.371**
5.85**
105 < .001
Stressed
5.98 (2.25)
4.81 (1.90)
0.476**
5.62**
105 < .001
Unpleasant
6.12 (2.10)
3.92 (1.80)
0.338**
10.07**
105 < .001
Conflicted
5.59 (2.40)
4.91 (1.88)
0.165
2.54*
105 0.012
Coherence Shifting
Importance
0.052 (0.048)
Affect
0.110 (0.092)
N = 106. * p < .05, ** p < .001.

0.066 (0.069) 0.117
0.076 (0.056) -0.064
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-1.91
3.20*

105
105

0.058
0.002

Table D6: Descriptive statistics and correlations for Experiment 1 between-task and exploratory analysis.
M (SD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 Serious Imp. ACS

0.05 (0.05)

2 Serious Affect ACS

0.11 (0.09)

.006

3 Job Imp. ACS

0.07 (0.07)

.117

.104

4 Job Affect ACS

0.08 (0.06)

-.238*

-.064

.112

5 BEQ Negative Emotionality

22.27 (6.06)

-.019

-.049

.071

.100

6 BEQ Positive Emotionality

21.15 (3.72)

.123

.190

.009

.095

.584**

7 BEQ Impulse Strength

26.75 (8.08)

.060

-.058

-.063

-.083

.468**

.339**

8 BEQ Overall

70.17 (14.43)

.057

-.004

-.003

.020

.832**

.692**

.844**

9 ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal

29.45 (5.12)

.007

.227*

.119

-.135

.020

.346**

-.128

.026

10 ERQ Expressive Suppression

14.12 (4.6)

.049

-.082

-.063

-.117

-.696**

-.678**

-.311**

-.641**

-.213*

11 Serious Choice Confidence

3.67 (0.81)

-.009

.304**

.150

-.009

-.088

-.031

-.061

-.079

.039

12 Job Choice Confidence

4.15 (1.04)

-.080

.155

.208*

.022

-.008

-.092

-.108

-.087

.017

13 Serious Confidence Change

0.41 (0.63)

-.118

.104

.135

.043

.078

.181

-.081

.034

.064

14 Job Confidence Change

0.56 (0.81)

-.095

.105

.175

.125

.173

.150

-.012

.105

.153

10

11

12

13

11 Serious Choice Confidence

.021

12 Job Choice Confidence

.082

.071

13 Serious Confidence Change

-.109

.302**

.095

14 Job Confidence Change
-.157
-.008
.615** .170
N = 106. * p < .05, ** p < .001, ACS = Absolute Coherence Shifting, Imp. = Importance, BEQ = Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire,
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.
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Appendix E: Experiment 2 Predictive Analysis Regression Coefficients
Table E1.1: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Mild disease pre- and mid-choice affect models.
Model 1: Affect (Charpentier)

Model 2.0: Affect (Mid-choice)

Model 2.1: Affect (Schlösser)

Predictors

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

T Admin

-0.15

0.15

0.86

[0.64,1.15]

-

-

-

-

-0.12

0.26

0.89

[0.51,1.46]

T Side Effects

-0.32

0.26

0.73

[0.42,1.16]

-

-

-

-

0.30

0.48

1.36

[0.50,3.51]

T Efficacy

0.03

0.25

1.03

[0.63,1.73]

-

-

-

-

0.40

0.45

1.49

[0.54,3.74]

T Duration

-0.55

0.29

0.58

[0.32,1.01]

-

-

-

-

-1.20

0.65

0.30

[0.07,0.95]

N Admin

0.13

0.12

1.14

[0.90,1.47]

-

-

-

-

0.45

0.29

1.56

[0.94,3.10]

N Side Effects

0.19

0.21

1.21

[0.82,1.84]

-

-

-

-

-0.06

0.37

0.94

[0.44,1.96]

N Efficacy

0.26

0.19

1.30

[0.90,1.92]

-

-

-

-

0.62

0.35

1.86

[1.00,4.10]

N Duration

0.10

0.12

1.10

[0.87,1.39]

-

-

-

-

0.24

0.23

1.27

[0.82,2.08]

T Positivity

-

-

-

-

0.85**

0.30

2.35

[1.37,4.55]

1.29**

0.47

3.64

[1.65,11.04]

T Arousal

-

-

-

-

0.34

0.33

1.40

[0.76,2.78]

0.18

0.37

1.20

[0.60,2.65]

T Dominance

-

-

-

-

0.32

0.24

1.37

[0.87,2.26]

0.72*

0.36

2.05

[1.05,4.48]

N Positivity

-

-

-

-

-1.05**

0.34

0.35

[0.17,0.63]

-1.06*

0.43

0.35

[0.13,0.72]

N Arousal

-

-

-

-

0.23

0.31

1.26

[0.69,2.34]

0.55

0.45

1.74

[0.72,4.61]

N Dominance

-

-

-

-

-0.31

0.23

0.73

[0.46,1.13]

-0.94*

0.47

0.39

[0.13,0.87]

Constant

-1.92

1.22

0.15

[0.01,1.52]

-0.96

1.97

0.38

[0.01,18.02]

-7.71*

3.89

0.00

[0.00,0.41]

N = 90. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
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Table E1.2: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Mild disease pre-choice attribute-based models.
Model 3.0: Attribute-based
Model 3.1: Lexicographic
Predictors
B
SE B OR 95%CI OR B
SE B OR 95%CI OR
T Admin
T Side Effects
T Efficacy
T Duration
N Admin
N Side Effects
N Efficacy
N Duration
Admin Importance
-0.22
0.15 0.81 [0.59,1.08]
Side Effect Importance -0.13
0.21 0.88 [0.57,1.33]
Efficacy Importance
-0.13
0.19 0.87 [0.59,1.27]
Duration Importance
0.63** 0.21 1.87 [1.26,2.95]
T Important Outcome
-0.18* -0.18 0.83 [0.69,0.97]
N Important Outcome 0.20
0.20 1.22 [0.99,1.54]
Constant
0.09
2.34 1.10 [0.01,120.49] 1.20** 1.20 3.31 [1.98,5.98]
N = 90. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
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Table E1.3: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Mild disease pre-choice Weighted Additive (W.Add) models.
Model 4.0: W.Add (main effects)
Model 4.1: W.Add (interaction)
Predictors
B
SE B OR 95%CI OR
B
SE B OR
95%CI OR
T Admin
-0.16
0.16 0.85
[0.61,1.16]
0.55
0.57
1.73
[0.58,5.76]
T Side Effects
-0.38
0.30 0.68
[0.36,1.15]
0.60
1.25
1.82
[0.15,23.11]
T Efficacy
0.11
0.28 1.12
[0.64,1.95]
1.64
1.53
5.16
[0.32,154.42]
T Duration
-0.35
0.31 0.70
[0.38,1.28]
1.03
1.78
2.81
[0.08,98.78]
N Admin
0.14
0.14 1.15
[0.88,1.54]
0.15
0.39
1.16
[0.56,2.71]
N Side Effects
0.20
0.23 1.23
[0.79,1.96]
0.06
1.12
1.06
[0.13,10.28]
N Efficacy
0.19
0.20 1.21
[0.82,1.82]
0.39
0.97
1.48
[0.22,11.19]
N Duration
0.15
0.13 1.17
[0.91,1.52]
0.29
0.61
1.34
[0.42,4.97]
Admin Importance
-0.16
0.18 0.86
[0.58,1.22]
-0.13
0.25
0.88
[0.51,1.42]
Side Effect Importance
-0.25
0.26 0.78
[0.46,1.27]
-0.83
0.78
0.44
[0.08,1.94]
Efficacy Importance
-0.18
0.22 0.84
[0.53,1.29]
0.45
0.71
1.57
[0.44,7.89]
Duration Importance
0.66*
0.26 1.93
[1.19,3.37]
-0.23
1.34
0.79
[0.06,12.69]
T Admin x Importance
-5.85
4.59
0.00
[0.00,13.08]
T Side Effects x Importance -8.01
10.43 0.00
[0.00,1.12*e5]
T Efficacy x Importance
-8.91
9.36
0.00
[0.00,2.13*e3]
T Duration x Importance
-10.31
13.38 0.00
[0.00,9.69*e6]
N Admin x Importance
0.25
3.38
1.29
[0.00,1.85*e3]
N Side Effects x Importance -1.57
9.06
0.21
[0.00,8.62*e6]
N Efficacy x Importance
1.18
5.77
3.24
[0.00,4.81*e5]
N Duration x Importance
1.32
4.84
3.73
[0.00,1.22*e5]
Constant
-1.92
2.92 0.15
[0.00,46.84]
2.08
10.45 8.01
[0.00,8.52*e9]
N = 90. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. W.Add = Weighted Additive. Extreme values are in scientific notation.
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Table E2.1: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Serious disease pre- and mid-choice affect models.
Model 1: Affect (Charpentier)

Model 2.0: Affect (Mid-choice)

Model 2.1: Affect (Schlösser)

Predictors

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

B

SE B

OR

95%CI OR

K Admin

-0.06

0.10

0.94

[0.76,1.15]

-

-

-

-

-0.27

0.26

0.76

[0.43,1.28]

K Side Effects

-0.35

0.32

0.71

[0.37,1.30]

-

-

-

-

1.14

0.65

3.13

[0.96,13.82]

K Efficacy

0.06

0.15

1.06

[0.79,1.41]

-

-

-

-

-0.14

0.38

0.87

[0.38,1.76]

K Duration

-0.21

0.13

0.81

[0.62,1.03]

-

-

-

-

0.31

0.28

1.37

[0.79,2.50]

M Admin

0.26

0.16

1.29

[0.96,1.80]

-

-

-

-

-0.15

0.30

0.86

[0.45,1.58]

M Side Effects

0.19

0.19

1.22

[0.84,1.79]

-

-

-

-

-1.27*

0.63

0.28

[0.06,0.80]

M Efficacy

0.00

0.14

1.00

[0.76,1.30]

-

-

-

-

0.52

0.44

1.67

[0.76,4.64]

M Duration

0.10

0.17

1.11

[0.80,1.55]

-

-

-

-

0.04

0.35

1.05

[0.52,2.15]

K Positivity

-

-

-

-

1.40**

0.37

4.07

[2.15,9.53]

2.19**

0.65

8.92

[3.20,47.54]

K Arousal

-

-

-

-

0.38

0.35

1.46

[0.74,3.05]

0.80

0.58

2.22

[0.76,8.26]

K Dominance

-

-

-

-

0.13

0.26

1.14

[0.68,1.92]

0.45

0.36

1.57

[0.82,3.57]

M Positivity

-

-

-

-

-1.01**

0.30

0.37

[0.19,0.62]

-1.91**

0.62

0.15

[0.03,0.40]

M Arousal

-

-

-

-

-0.24

0.35

0.79

[0.38,1.56]

-0.48

0.47

0.62

[0.22,1.53]

M Dominance

-

-

-

-

-0.76*

0.30

0.47

[0.24,0.80]

-1.34**

0.51

0.26

[0.07,0.60]

Constant

-0.36

1.24

0.70

[0.06,8.22]

0.76

2.05

2.14

[0.04,146.29]

4.25

3.44

70.25

[0.12,1.55•e5]

N = 88. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.

128

Table E2.2: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Serious disease pre-choice attribute-based models.
Model 3.0: Attribute-based
Model 3.1: Lexicographic
Predictors
B
SE B OR
95%CI OR
B
SE B OR 95%CI OR
K Admin
K Side Effects
K Efficacy
K Duration
M Admin
M Side Effects
M Efficacy
M Duration
Admin Importance
-0.08 0.15 0.92 [0.68,1.24]
Side Effect Importance -0.11 0.17 0.90 [0.63,1.26]
Efficacy Importance
-0.40* 0.18 0.67 [0.46,0.94]
Duration Importance
0.12
0.15 1.13 [0.84,1.54]
K Important Outcome -0.09 -0.09 0.91 [0.76,1.10]
M Important Outcome -0.10 -0.10 0.91 [0.71,1.15]
Constant
3.40
1.90 29.89 [0.80,1,437.88] -0.16 -0.16 0.85 [0.45,1.57]
N = 88. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio.
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Table E2.3: Logistic regression coefficients for Study 2 Serious disease pre-choice Weighted Additive (W.Add) models.
Model 4.0: W.Add (main effects)
Model 4.1: W.Add (interaction)
Predictors
B
SE B OR 95%CI OR
B
SE B OR
95%CI OR
K Admin
-0.05
0.11 0.95 [0.76,1.18]
0.30
0.46
1.35
[0.55,3.42]
K Side Effects
-0.51
0.35 0.60 [0.29,1.18]
-0.11
1.75
0.89
[0.03,28.54]
K Efficacy
0.16
0.16 1.17 [0.85,1.63]
-0.62
0.86
0.54
[0.09,2.83]
K Duration
-0.16
0.14 0.86 [0.64,1.11]
-1.28
0.67
0.28
[0.06,0.86]
M Admin
0.23
0.16 1.26 [0.93,1.77]
0.21
0.43
1.23
[0.52,2.95]
M Side Effects
0.16
0.22 1.17 [0.77,1.82]
-0.80
0.93
0.45
[0.07,2.91]
M Efficacy
-0.06
0.15 0.94 [0.69,1.26]
1.16
0.75
3.18
[0.78,16.34]
M Duration
0.19
0.20 1.21 [0.83,1.81]
0.50
0.71
1.65
[0.42,6.97]
Admin Importance
-0.18
0.20 0.84 [0.56,1.23]
-0.26
0.35
0.77
[0.38,1.56]
Side Effect Importance
-0.04
0.19 0.96 [0.65,1.40]
0.05
1.32
1.05
[0.08,15.06]
Efficacy Importance
-0.44* 0.20 0.64 [0.43,0.93]
-0.99** 0.37
0.37
[0.17,0.72]
Duration Importance
0.06
0.17 1.07 [0.76,1.51]
0.86
0.62
2.37
[0.73,8.65]
K Admin x Importance
-3.12
3.58
0.04
[0.00,44.69]
K Side Effects x Importance -4.94
14.51 0.01
[0.00,2.48•e10]
K Efficacy x Importance
5.10
5.30
163.84
[0.01,1.01•e7]
K Duration x Importance
9.23
4.89
10,208.62 [1.78,4.24•e8]
M Admin x Importance
0.26
3.37
1.29
[0.00,1.07•e3]
M Side Effects x Importance -8.54
7.39
0.00
[0.00,408.32]
M Efficacy x Importance
7.79
4.66
2,416.59 [0.41,6.36•e7]
M Duration x Importance
2.32
4.92
10.17
[0.00,2.09•e5]
Constant
3.14
2.27 23.09 [0.30,2,383.15] 1.62
9.40
5.04
[0.00,7.71•e8]
N = 88. * p < .05, ** p < .001. OR = Odds Ratio. W.Add = Weighted Additive. Extreme values are in scientific notation.
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Appendix F: Experiment 2 (Mild and Serious Disease) Coherence Shifting, Skin Conductance, and Exploratory
Statistics
Table F1.1: Coherence shifting of Study 2 mild disease importance scores by choice, time, and favored treatment: MANOVA results
Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

ηG2

3-way (Choice by Time by Favored)

0.075

3.55*

2, 88

0.033

0.018

2-way (Choice by Time)

0.269

16.18**

2, 88

<.001

0.081

2-way (Choice by Favored)

0.025

1.11

2, 88

0.335

0.006

2-way (Time by Favored)

0.086

4.14*

2, 88

0.019

0.020

Choice (Main Effect)

0.066

3.10

2, 88

0.050

0.016

Time (Main Effect)

0.226

12.88**

2, 88

<.001

0.061

Treatment Favored (Main Effect)

0.078

3.71*

2, 88

0.028

0.018

N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared.

Table F1.2: Coherence shifting of mild disease importance scores: Simple-effects univariate tests.
Univariate

N

2-way (Time by Favored)
F
Df
p
ηG2

Time
F

Df

p

ηG

Chose T

24

0.01

1, 23

0.946

0.000

2.42

1, 23

0.133

0.050

8.95*

1, 23

0.007

0.163

Chose N

67

15.52**

1, 66

<.001

0.105

0.66

1, 66

0.419

0.005

23.51**

1, 66

<.001

0.151

N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared.
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2

Treatment Favored (K vs M)
F
df
p
ηG2

Table F2.1: Coherence shifting of Study 2 mild disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Interactions.
3-way (Choice by Time by Treatment)
Multivariate
Affect
Univariate

Pillai’s Trace
0.226

2-way (Choice by Time)

F
6.29**
F

Df
4, 86
Df

p
<.001
p

ηG2
0.060
ηG2

Admin

3.55

1, 89

0.063

Side Effects

1.23

1, 89

Efficacy

6.41*

Duration

6.28*

F
9.97**
F

Df
4, 86
Df

p
<.001
p

ηG2
0.095
ηG2

0.005

8.36*

1, 89

0.005

0.049

0.270

0.002

3.31

1, 89

0.072

0.018

1, 89

0.013

0.010

4.19*

1, 89

0.044

0.016

1, 89

0.014

0.013

15.29**

1, 89

<.001

0.069

2-way (Choice by Treatment)

Pillai’s Trace
0.317

2-way (Time by Treatment)

Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

ηG2

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

P

ηG2

Affect

0.022

0.49

4, 86

0.743

0.005

0.022

9.52**

4, 86

<.001

0.083

Univariate

F

df

p

ηG2

F

Df

P

ηG2

Admin

0.37

1, 89

0.544

0.001

4.52*

1, 89

0.036

0.007

Side Effects

0.19

1, 89

0.662

0.000

3.37

1, 89

0.070

0.006

Efficacy

1.24

1, 89

0.269

0.002

19.65**

1, 89

<.001

0.031

Duration

0.21

1, 89

0.648

0.001

17.18**

1, 89

<.001

0.033

N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared.
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Table F2.2: Coherence shifting of Study 2 mild disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Main effects.
Choice

Time

Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

df

p

ηG

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

ηG2

Affect

0.096

2.28

4, 86

0.067

0.022

0.907

209.44**

4, 86

<.001

0.666

Univariate

F

df

p

ηG2

F

Df

P

ηG2

Admin

0.00

1, 89

0.957

0.000

15.93**

1, 89

<.001

0.085

Side Effects

0.98

Efficacy

7.78*

1, 89

0.324

0.002

40.5**

1, 89

<.001

0.177

1, 89

0.006

0.026

273.25**

1, 89

<.001

0.505

Duration

0.16

1, 89

0.693

0.000

725.23**

1, 89

<.001

0.767

2

Treatment (T vs N)
Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

df

p

ηG2

Affect

0.307

9.52**

4, 86

<.001

0.083

Univariate

F

Df

p

ηG2

Admin

1.06

1, 89

0.307

0.002

Side Effects

0.57

1, 89

0.451

0.001

Efficacy

2.77

1, 89

0.100

0.005

Duration

33.44**

1, 89

<.001

0.078

N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared.
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Table F3: Coherence shifting of Study 2 serious disease importance scores by choice, time, and favored treatment: MANOVA results.
Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

ηG2

3-way (Choice by Time by Favored)

0.098

4.72*

2, 87

0.011

0.025

2-way (Choice by Time)

0.139

7.03*

2, 87

0.002

0.037

2-way (Choice by Favored)

0.042

1.89

2, 87

0.157

0.046

2-way (Time by Favored)

0.054

2.48

2, 87

0.090

0.010

Choice (Main Effect)

0.054

2.49

2, 87

0.089

0.013

Time (Main Effect)

0.054

2.49

2, 87

0.089

0.013

Treatment Favored (Main Effect)

0.174

9.14**

2, 87

<.001

0.046

N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared.
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Table F4.1: Coherence shifting of Study 2 serious disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Interactions.
3-way (Choice by Time by Treatment)
Multivariate
Affect
Univariate

Pillai’s Trace
0.368

2-way (Choice by Time)

F
12.52**
F

Df
4, 86
Df

p
<.001
p

ηG2
0.118
ηG2

Admin

14.17**

1, 89

<.001

Side Effects

8.51*

1, 89

Efficacy

14.66**

Duration

5.47*

F
6.58**
F

Df
4, 86
Df

p
<.001
p

ηG2
0.062
ηG2

0.024

7.26*

1, 89

0.008

0.035

0.004

0.016

10.15*

1, 89

0.002

0.045

1, 89

<.001

0.019

1.20

1, 89

0.276

0.004

1, 89

0.022

0.010

5.15*

1, 89

0.026

0.025

2-way (Choice by Treatment)

Pillai’s Trace
0.234

2-way (Time by Treatment)

Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

ηG

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

P

ηG2

Affect

0.052

1.19

4, 86

0.321

0.011

0.353

11.73

4, 86

<.001

0.099

Univariate

F

df

p

ηG2

F

Df

P

ηG2

Admin

1.53

1, 89

Side Effects

1.20

1, 89

0.219

0.003

0.08

1, 89

0.780

0.000

0.277

0.002

9.33*

1, 89

0.003

0.017

Efficacy

0.96

1, 89

0.329

0.003

22.28**

1, 89

<.001

0.028

Duration

0.28

1, 89

0.601

0.001

26.14**

1, 89

<.001

0.045

2

N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared.

135

Table F4.2: Coherence shifting of Study 2 serious disease affect scores by choice, time, and treatment: Main effects.
Choice

Time

Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

df

p

ηG

Pillai’s Trace

F

Df

p

ηG2

Affect

0.012

0.26

4, 86

0.902

0.002

0.817

95.73**

4, 86

<.001

0.473

Univariate

F

df

P

ηG2

F

Df

p

ηG2

Admin

0.03

1, 89

0.860

0.000

150.19**

1, 89

<.001

0.419

Side Effects

0.04

Efficacy

0.35

1, 89

0.844

0.000

161.70**

1, 89

<.001

0.417

1, 89

0.554

0.001

181.42**

1, 89

<.001

0.367

Duration

0.29

1, 89

0.595

0.000

4.93*

1, 89

0.029

0.023

2

Treatment (K vs M)
Multivariate

Pillai’s Trace

F

df

p

ηG2

Affect

0.565

27.87**

4, 86

<.001

0.207

Univariate

F

Df

p

ηG2

Admin

5.11*

1, 89

0.026

0.009

Side Effects

32.08**

1, 89

<.001

0.054

Efficacy

0.96

1, 89

0.329

0.003

Duration

88.71**

1, 89

<.001

0.193

N = 91. * p < .05, ** p < .001. ηG2 = Generalized Eta-Squared.
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Table F5: Regression coefficients and statistics effects of coherence shifting and time on skin conductance level.
Mild Disease Task
Parameter
B
SE (B) t (df)
p
95%CI B
Intercept
1.83
0.26 7.05** (14) < .001 [1.27, 2.38]
Time (Quadratic)
-0.20 0.05 -4.03** (14) < .001 [-0.30, -0.09]
zACSoverall
0.08
0.15 0.55 (14)
0.59
[-0.25, 0.41]
Time (Linear)
0.84
0.19 4.32**(14)
< .001 [0.42, 1.25]
Time (linear) * zACS
-0.03 0.12 -0.23 (14)
0.82
[-0.27, 0.22]
Time (quadratic) * zACS 0.01
0.03 0.48 (14)
0.64
[-0.25, 0.08]
N = 16. * p < .05. ** p < .001. zACSoverall = overall absolute coherence shifting of affect and importance scores.
Serious Disease Task
Parameter
Intercept
Time (Quadratic)
zACSoverall
Time (Linear)
Time (linear) * zACS
Time (quadratic) * zACS

B
2.13
-0.14
0.15
0.58
0.13
-0.03

SE (B)
0.27
0.04
0.16
0.17
0.10
0.02

t (df)
7.85** (11.94)
-3.36* (5.97)
0.95 (11.94)
3.51* (5.35)
1.31 (5.35)
-1.41 (5.97)

p
< .001
0.02
0.36
0.02
0.24
0.21

95%CI B
[1.54, 2.72]
[-0.24, -0.04]
[-0.19, 0.50]
[0.16, 1.00]
[-0.12, 0.37]
[-0.09, 0.03]

N = 14. * p < .05, ** p < .001. zACSoverall = overall absolute coherence shifting of affect and importance scores.

137

Table F6: Aversive feelings and overall strength of Coherence Shifting in the Study 2 mild and serious disease tasks.
Mild Disease
Serious Disease
Task
Task
r (Between- PairedFeeling
M (SD)
M (SD)
Task)
samples t
df
P
Anxious
4.49 (1.61)
5.88 (1.77)
0.426**
7.03**
83
< .001
Stressed
4.50 (1.84)
5.88 (1.95)
0.496**
6.64**
83
< .001
Unpleasant
4.49 (187)
5.68 (2.03)
0.373**
4.99**
83
< .001
Conflicted
4.55 (1.91)
5.27 (2.06)
0.271*
2.77*
83
0.007
Coherence Shifting
Importance
0.084 (0.075)
Affect
0.101 (0.076)
N = 84. * p < .05, ** p < .001.

0.308 (0.069)
0.113 (0.082)

0.136
-0.179
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-0.072
0.940

83
83

0.943
0.350

Table F7: Descriptive statistics and correlations for Experiment 2 between-task and exploratory analysis.
M (SD)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 Mild Imp. ACS

0.08 (0.08)

2 Mild Affect ACS

0.1 (0.08)

.113

3 Serious Imp. ACS

0.08 (0.07)

.136

-.062

4 Serious Affect ACS

0.11 (0.08)

-.139

-.179

.219*

5 BEQ Negative Emotionality

22.85 (6.16)

.035

.293**

-.020

-.102

6 BEQ Positive Emotionality

20.75 (3.8)

.033

.109

.064

.019

.633**

7 BEQ Impulse Strength

27.05 (6.41)

.041

.273*

.017

-.021

.494**

.575**

8 BEQ Overall

70.64 (13.79)

.044

.288**

.017

-.050

.851**

.826**

.844**

9 ERQ Cognitive Reappraisal

29.99 (5.21)

.018

.053

-.015

.054

.263*

.223*

-.089

.137

10 ERQ Expressive Suppression

13.96 (5.24)

.044

-.106

.090

.070

-.667**

-.578**

-.389**

-.638**

-.331**

11 Serious Choice Confidence

3.73 (0.83)

.107

.003

-.046

-.044

-.037

.066

-.084

-.037

-.101

12 Job Choice Confidence

3.38 (0.86)

-.068

-.031

-.031

.200

-.116

.136

-.095

-.058

.084

13 Serious Confidence Change

0.05 (0.73)

-.081

-.267*

-.102

.181

-.085

-.013

-.148

-.110

.051

14 Job Confidence Change

0.12 (0.67)

-.186

-.084

-.152

.070

-.057

-.021

-.179

-.115

-.062

10

11

12

13

11 Mild Choice Confidence

.037

12 Serious Choice Confidence

.016

.368**

13 Mild Confidence Change

-.085

.483**

.317**

14 Serious Confidence Change
.074 .038
.318** .063
N = 84. * p < .05, ** p < .001, ACS = Absolute Coherence Shifting, Imp. = Importance, BEQ = Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire,
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.
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Appendix G: Aggregate Coherence Shifting Measures
This method for creating an aggregate coherence shifting measure was adapted
from Carpenter et al., 2016. To create an aggregate variable for outcome affect ratings, all
outcome ratings are first linearly transformed to a -1 to +1 scale and then combined using
the following formula (with subscripts based on the serious disease task):
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =

1
�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝐾𝐾 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝐾𝐾 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝐾𝐾 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐾𝐾
8

− 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑀𝑀 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,𝑀𝑀 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑀𝑀 �

where K is Treatment K, M is Treatment M, and “Admin” is Administration method.

This will result in a value ranging from -1 to +1, with -1 representing maximum affectbased favorability towards Treatment M’s outcomes and +1 representing maximum
favorability to Treatment K’s outcomes.
This score will be calculated for both pre-choice and mid-choice ratings, and a
change score for affect between pre- and mid-choice times can be computed as:
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

where negative scores would indicate a shift towards Treatment M and positive
scores would mean a shift towards Treatment K. (Note that scores above +/-1 are possible
but would require a large reversal of preferences between these two times.) These
changes must be examined to ensure they are in the correct direction given the final
choice. For participants where this is the case, the absolute value of the affect change
score can be used as a measure of affect coherence shifting magnitude.
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = �𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 �
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Similarly, a composite variable can be calculated for attribute importance weights
after they have been linearly scaled to a 0 to 1 scale, using the formula:
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =

1
�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 �
4

where, in the serious disease task, Administration methods and Efficacy are
favorable for Treatment K, and Side effects and Duration of symptoms are favorable for
Treatment M (See Table 3). This measure also ranges from -1 to + 1 with positive scores
being favorable towards Treatment K and negative scores favorable to Treatment M. This
can also be used to calculate a pre-choice to mid-choice difference score:
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

Then, if the direction of change is appropriate, an absolute measure of magnitude
is calculated.
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = �𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 �

ACSAff and ACSImp are sufficiently aggregated to be used for between-tasks
comparisons.
Additionally, a measure of overall within-task coherence shifting is necessary for
comparisons with skin conductance. For this individual differences measure, z-scores will
be taken for the two coherence-shifting variables and summed.
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑧𝑧(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ) + 𝑧𝑧(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 )

141

REFERENCES
Abelson, R. P. (1995). Statistics as principled argument. New York, NY: Psychology
Press.
Akaike, H. (1973). Information theory and an extension of the maximum likelihood
principle. In B. N. Petrov & F. Csàki (Eds.), Proceedings of the Second
International Symposium on Information Theory (pp. 267-281). Budapest,
Akadémiai Kaidó.
Alhakami, A. S., & Slovic, P. (1994). A psychological study of the inverse relationship
between perceived risk and perceived benefit. Risk Analysis, 14(6), 1085-1096.
https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1%3C1::aidbdm333%3E3.0.co;2-s
Bakeman, R. (2005). Recommended effect size statistics for repeated measures designs.
Behavior Research Methods, 37(3), 379-384. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03192707
Bechara, A., & Damasio, A. R. (2005). The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory
of economic decision. Games and Economic Behavior, 52(2), 336-372.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.010
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (2000). Characterization of the decision-making
deficit of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions. Brain, 123(11),
2189-2202. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/123.11.2189
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (1996). Failure to respond
autonomically to anticipated future outcomes following damage to prefrontal
cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 6(2), 215-225. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/6.2.215

142

Bickel, R. (2007). Multilevel Analysis for Applied Regression: It’s Just Regression! (1st
ed.). New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Boucsein, W. (2012). Electrodermal activity (2nd Ed.). Springer Science & Business
Media.
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1994). Measuring emotion: The self-assessment manikin
and the semantic differential. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental
Psychiatry, 25(1), 49-59. https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-7916(94)90063-9
Burnham, K. P., & Anderson, D. R. (2004). Multimodel inference: understanding AIC
and BIC in model selection. Sociological Methods & Research, 33(2), 261-304.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124104268644
Byrne, K.A., Peters, C., & Willis, H.C. (2018, May). Working hard or hardly
working? How emotion affects effort-based decision-making. To be presented at
the Association for Psychological Science, San Francisco, CA.
Carpenter, S. M., & Niedenthal, P. M. (2017). Emotional processes in risky and
multiattribute health decisions. Psychology & Health, 33, 58-76.
https://doi.org/10.1080/08870446.2017.1314478
Carpenter, S. M., Yates, J. F., Preston, S. D., & Chen, L. (2016). Regulating emotions
during difficult multiattribute decision making: The role of pre-decisional
coherence shifting. PloS one, 11(3), e0150873.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0150873

143

Charpentier, C. J., De Neve, J. E., Li, X., Roiser, J. P., & Sharot, T. (2016). Models of
affective decision making: How do feelings predict choice? Psychological
Science, 27(6), 763-775. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797616634654
Cohen, J. (1988), Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd Ed.).
Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Cohen, J., & Cohen, J. (2003). Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the
behavioral sciences. Mahwah, N.J: L. Erlbaum Associates.
Ekstrom, R.B., French, J.W. & Harman, H.H. (1976). Manual for kit of factor-referenced
cognitive tests. Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service.
Elwyn, G., Laitner, S., Coulter, A., Walker, E., Watson, P., & Thomson, R. (2010).
Implementing shared decision making in the NHS. BMJ, 341, 971-975.
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.c5146
Elwyn, G., Frosch, D., Thomson, R., Joseph-Williams, N., Lloyd, A., Kinnersley, P., …
Barry, M. (2012). Shared Decision Making: A Model for Clinical Practice.
Journal of General Internal Medicine, 27(10), 1361–1367.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11606-012-2077-6
Figner, B., & Murphy, R. O. (2011). Using skin conductance in judgment and decision
making research. In M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, A. Kuehberger, & R. Ranyard
(Eds.), A handbook of process tracing methods for decision research. New York,
NY: Psychology Press.

144

Goldberg, L. R. (2010). Personality, demographics, and self-reported behavioral acts: The
development of avocational interest scales from estimates of the amount of time
spent in interest-related activities. In C. R. Agnew, D. E. Carlston, W. G.
Graziano, & J. R. Kelly (Eds.), Then a miracle occurs: Focusing on behavior in
social psychological theory and research (pp. 205-226). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Gross, J.J., & John, O.P. (1998). Mapping the domain of expressivity: Multi-method
evidence for a hierarchical model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
74, 170-191.
Gross, J.J., & John, O.P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation
processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 435-448.
Hobson, N. M., Saunders, B., Al-Khindi, T., & Inzlicht, M. (2014). Emotion downregulation diminishes cognitive control: A neurophysiological investigation.
Emotion, 14(6), 1014-1026. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038028
Hastie, R., & Dawes, R. M. (2010). From preferences to Choices. In Rational choice in
an uncertain world: The psychology of judgment and decision making (2nd Ed.)
(pp. 217-236). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Hunt, E. (2002). Thoughts on thought: A discussion of formal models of cognition.
Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Jarvis, B. G. (2012). MediaLab (Version 2012) [Computer Software]. New York, NY:
Empirisoft Corporation.

145

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
Kilpatrick, D. G. (1972). Differential responsiveness of two electrodermal indices to
psychological stress and performance of a complex cognitive task.
Psychophysiology, 9(2), 218-226. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14698986.1972.tb00756.x
Kuykendall, D., & Keating, J. P. (1990). Mood and persuasion: Evidence for the
differential influence of positive and negative states. Psychology & Marketing, 7,
1-9. https://doi.org/10.1002/mar.4220070102
Lang, P. J. (1980). Behavioral treatment and bio-behavioral assessment: Computer
applications. In J. B. Sidowski, J. H. Johnson, & T. A. Williams (Eds.),
Technology in mental health care delivery systems (pp. 119-l37). Norwood, NJ:
Ablex.
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 81(1), 146-159. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.81.1.146
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as
feelings. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 267-286. https://doi.org/10.1037/00332909.127.2.267
Luce, M. F. (1998). Choosing to avoid: Coping with negatively emotion‐laden consumer
decisions. Journal of Consumer Research, 24(4), 409–433.
https://doi.org/10.1086/209518

146

Makoul, G., & Clayman, M. L. (2006). An integrative model of shared decision making
in medical encounters. Patient Education and Counseling, 60(3), 301-312.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2005.06.010
Marks, I. M., & Matthews, A. M. (1979). Brief standard self-rating for phobic
patients. Behavior Research & Therapy, 17, 263-267.
Marr, D. (1982), Vision: A Computational Approach, San Francisco, Freeman & Co.
Mehrabian, A. (1995). Framework for a comprehensive description and measurement of
emotional states. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 121,
339–361.
Payne, J. W., & Bettman, J. R. (2004). Walking with the scarecrow: The informationprocessing approach to decision research. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.).
Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 110-132).
Peters, E. (2006). The functions of affect in the construction of preferences. In S.
Lichtenstein & P. Slovic (eds.) The construction of preference, (pp. 454-463).
New York, NY: Cambridge.
Peters, E., Dieckmann, N. F., Västfjäll, D., Mertz, C. K., Slovic, P., & Hibbard, J. H.
(2009). Bringing meaning to numbers: The impact of evaluative categories on
decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 15(3), 213-227.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016978
Ratcliff, R., & McKoon, G. (2008). The diffusion decision model: Theory and data for
two-choice decision tasks. Neural Computation, 20(4), 873-922.

147

Schlösser, T., Dunning, D., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2013). What a feeling: The role of
immediate and anticipated emotions in risky decisions. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 26(1), 13-30. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.757
Simon, D. (2004). A third view of the black box: Cognitive coherence in legal decision
making. The University of Chicago Law Review, 71(2), 511-586.
Simon, D., & Holyoak, K. J. (2002). Structural dynamics of cognition: From consistency
theories to constraint satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology review, 6(4),
283-294. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0604_03
Simon, D., Krawczyk, D. C., Bleicher, A., & Holyoak, K. J. (2008). The transience of
constructed preferences. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 21(1), 1-14.
https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.575
Simon, D., Krawczyk, D. C., & Holyoak, K. J. (2004). Construction of preferences by
constraint satisfaction. Psychological Science, 15(5), 331-336.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00678.x
Simon, D., Pham, L. B., Le, Q. A., & Holyoak, K. J. (2001). The emergence of coherence
over the course of decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27(5), 1250-1260.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.27.5.1250
Simon, D., & Spiller, S. A. (2016). The Elasticity of Preferences. Psychological Science,
27(12), 1588-1599. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797616666501
Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 236, 280-285.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3563507

148

Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004). Risk as analysis and
risk as feelings: Some thoughts about affect, reason, risk, and rationality. Risk
Analysis, 24, 311-322. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00433.x
Stacey, D., Bennett, C. L., Barry, M. J., Col, N. F., Eden, K. B., Holmes-Rovner, M., ...
& Thomson, R. (2011). Decision aids for people facing health treatment or
screening decisions. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 2011(10).
Htpps://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD001431.pub3
Strecher, V. J., McEvoy DeVellis, B., Becker, M. H., & Rosenstock, I. M. (1986). The
role of self-efficacy in achieving health behavior change. Health Education
Quarterly, 13(1), 73-92. https://doi.org/10.1177/109019818601300108
Thurstone, L. L. (1928). Attitudes can be measured. American Journal of Sociology, 33,
529-554. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/214483
Tiziani, A. (2017). Harvard’s Nursing Guide to Drugs (10th ed.). Chatswood, NSW:
Elsevier.
Tversky, A. (1972). Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice. Psychological Review,
79, 281-299. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0032955
Usher, M., & McClelland, J. L. (2001). The time course of perceptual choice: The leaky,
competing accumulator model. Psychological Review, 108(3), 550.
van Smeden, M., de Groot, J. A., Moons, K. G., Collins, G. S., Altman, D. G., Eijkemans,
M. J., & Reitsma, J. B. (2016). No rationale for 1 variable per 10 events criterion
for binary logistic regression analysis. BMC Medical Research Methodology, 16,
163. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12874-016-0267-3

149

Vittinghoff, E., & McCulloch, C. E. (2007). Relaxing the rule of ten events per variable
in logistic and Cox regression. American Journal of Epidemiology, 165(6), 710718. https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwk052
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of games and economic behavior
(2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press.
Weinstein, N. D., & Sandman, P. M. (2002). The precaution adoption process model and
its application. In R. J. DiClemente, R. A. Crosby, & M. C. Kegler (Eds.)
Emerging theories in health promotion practice and research. (pp. 16-39) San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Wong, Y. N., Egleston, B. L., Sachdeva, K., Eghan, N., Pirollo, M., Stump, T. K., ... &
Meropol, N. J. (2013). Cancer patients' trade-offs among efficacy, toxicity and
out-of-pocket cost in the curative and non-curative setting. Medical Care, 51(9).
https://doi.org/10.1097/MLR.0b013e31829faffd.

150

